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Abstract 
As a consequence of the burgeoning e-commerce industry, the conventional 
security measures for authentication and online transaction can no longer fulfill 
the current stringent Internet environment. The reliability and the credibility 
of the traditional e-commerce systems are at stake due to the advance of the 
reverse-engineering technology and the vulnerability of the operating system 
because the application logic residing in the client machine is susceptible to 
intrusion. 
With the appropriate deployment of tamper-resistant smart cards, the re-
sulting system is less likely to be attacked easily. Nevertheless, most of the 
published authentication protocols on smart card based system suffer from 
different tricky problems such as heavy dependence on symmetric key cryp-
tography. Even worse, some of them are not feasible to be implemented on 
the ordinary smart cards, or need further enhancement due to inappropriate 
design. 
This thesis has several objectives. It fashions a coherent study on the state-
of-the-art of smart card systems, authentication and transaction protocols. By 
analyzing the related work, we identify potential critical defects such as the 
ignorance of mutual authentication. As a remedy, we propose efficient smart 
card based authentication and transaction protocols. 
The proposed comprehensive scheme not only supports local authentica-
tion protocol, either password-based or biometric-based, but also supports 
unique remote authentication protocol for secure remote access. It performs 
i 
mutual authentication and resists replaying attack. A secret session key is also 
established between both client and server sides after the completion of the 
authentication protocol by the silent key distribution scheme. The session key 
can be used for subsequent communications. The devised protocol can handle 
both the smart card and server failures well. The transaction protocol for the 
micro-payment built on top of the authentication protocol is described. This 
protocol enables reliable transaction, efficient and faultless resumption from 
broken transactions. 
An in-depth analysis based on BAN logic, which is not done in other sim-
ilar work, to prove the correctness of the proposed authentication protocol is 
described. In addition, the experimental evaluation results of the proposed 
protocols are detailed to show the efficiency and the effectiveness of the pro-
tocols. 
Lastly, to make ease of the development of smart card based system, we 
have designed and implemented an innovative builder, Smart RAD, for B2C & 
P2P e-commerce software development. The implementation is comprised of 
an application-programming interface and utility builder to facilitate the appli-
cation developers to customize their own authentication and different services, 
say the transaction service. Functionally, it provides strong authentication, 
reliable transaction, accountability, personalization, customization and PKI 
systems. A comparison with other smart card development kits would be 
shown. 
As our last contribution, a P2P and B2C application, Multi-MAX, is imple-
mented to successfully demonstrate the feasibility and the flexibility of Smart 
RAD. It allows the user to purchase a product from a retail shop on the web 
or trade with other users through an application based interface. 
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Reverse engineering, Trojan horses and physical intrusion are the tricky issues 
in the security of the e-commerce software in recent years. With the new 
discovery on the vulnerability of the operating system, intruders are able to 
attack a remote host. 
Usually, the application logic of e-commerce systems resides in the client 
host and the security of the client host is always undermined. With the rapid 
enhancement of the reverse engineering technology, hostile users can extract 
the high-level representation of the application and the data flow within the 
application logic. By understanding the application logic, hostile users can 
re-engineer the application logic and bypass the system security measure such 
that hostile users can perform restricted operations illegally or at the worst 
case, interrupt the regular operation of the application server. 
In addition, the remote attack with Trojan horses is one of the common 
scenario in cyber attacks. It is not necessary for the intruder to have physical 
contact with the targeted computer. Instead, Trojan horses are installed in 
the targeted computer by other means in advance. The intruder can remotely 
monitor the user's action, read and write processes in the targeted computer. 
Hence, the application logic in the targeted computer can be attacked easily. 
To cope with these serious problems, the application logic should be in-
stalled in a tamper-proof device such that no unauthorized local and remote 
1 
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access is allowed without the knowledge of the computer owner. The solution 
is Smart Cards. 
Tamper-resistant feature prevents the smart card from being attacked eas-
ily. The cost for hacking an advanced smart card is unreasonably high. More-
over, with the memory and processing chip, the smart card can store and 
manipulate the sensitive information without leaking out. The smart card can 
communicate with other parties secretly with the help of the cryptographic 
co-processor. These factors contribute to the trend that the smart card is very 
popular in e-commerce applications. 
1.1 Authentication and Transaction Protocol 
The smart card is particularly useful in the authentication and the transaction 
processes. The smart card helps to identify the valid card holder and performs 
secure transactions. 
Today, most of the smart card based authentication protocols ignore the 
mutual authentication and perform only user authentication. Also, some of 
the published works suffer from critical problems that make them not realistic 
to be used practically. More importantly, some of them are not allowed to be 
implemented on different types of smart cards. 
As a matter of fact, the biometric-based authentication system can protect 
the system for local access. However, it may not be true for remote access. 
Several studies [58] [30] [40] have shown that biometric-based systems cannot 
simply apply to remote access systems. 
These concerns motivate us to design a new local and remote authentication 
protocol, which can be used in biometric-based or password-based local/remote 
access systems. The proposed protocol is designed to eliminate the critical 
defects in existing protocols. 
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1.2 E-Commerce Enabler 
Development of smart card based applications is not trivial. It involves the 
understanding of smart card operating systems, underlying system of card ter-
minal, cryptographic theory and its related development libraries. In addition, 
the time to familiarize oneself with the usage of smart card and smart card 
reader is considerately long compared with other application developments. 
It drives us to propose an innovative solution for smart card enabled soft-
ware developments particular to B2C and P2P e-commerce softwares, which 
are designed for speeding up the development time. Unlike [22] [19] [18] [20 
55] , it is intended to encapsulate the underlying mechanism of smart cards 
so that the developer can develop a smart card based system easily without 
considering the complicated smart card architecture. 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
In this chapter, we fashion a coherent study on the state-of-the-art of crypto-
graphic techniques, smart card issues, authentication and transaction issues. 
The internal mechanism of the one-way hash function, DES, triple DES and 
elliptic curve will be described. The current issues of authentication and trans-
action protocols will be examined. Finally, the BAN logic is introduced for 
the analysis of authentication protocols. 
2.1 Cryptographic Preliminaries 
In this section, we will overview the most common used cryptographic algo-
rithms and techniques in smart cards. 
2.1.1 One-Way Hash Function 
One-way hash function is commonly used on message authentication by pro-
ducing a “ fingerprint" of a message. MD5 and SHAl are examples of well-
known hash function. A hash function, H can be generalized in this form: 
h — H(M), where M is the input message 
Typically, the hash function must have the following properties: 
4 
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• H can be applied to any block of data M with any size. 
• The hash value h always has a fixed length. 
• For any given M, H{M) can be computed easily. 
• For any hash value it is computationally infeasible to find M such 
that H{M) — h. This is called one-way property. 
• For any given data M, it is computational infeasible to find N such that 
H{M) = H{N). This is called weak collision resistance. 
• It is computational infeasible to find any pair (M, N) such that H{M)— 
H{N). This is called strong collision resistance. 
2.1.2 Triple DES 
Triple DES is the variation of Data Encryption Standard (DES) [57] [64] which 
is adopted in 1977 by the National Bureau of Standards. In DES, data are 
encrypted in 64-bit blocks using a 56-bit key. The algorithm transforms a 64-
bit input in a series of steps into a 64-bit output. The same steps, with the 
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Figure 2.1: Simple view of DES 
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By and large, the design criteria of DES are: 
1. Randomness 
The output is changed randomly. 
2. Nonlinearity 
The encryption function is non-affine to any value of key. 
3. Avalanche Property 
It is a property of the ordinary encryption algorithm, that a small change 
of inputs (plaintext or key) results in a significant change in the cipher-
text. 
4. Correlation Immunity 
The output bits are statically independent of any subset of input bits. 
5. Completeness Property 
Each bit of ciphertext is a complex function of ALL input bits. 
However, DES suffers from brute-force attacks, and hence, a substitute 
for it, triple DES is found to make the best use of the existing DES devices. 
Triple DES is now adopted for the use in the key management standards of 
ANS X9.17 and ISO 8732. Figure 2.2 describes the mechanism of triple DES in 
encrypt-encrypt-encrypt (EEE) and encrypt-decrypt-encrypt (EDE) modes. 
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Figure 2.2: Simple view of 3DES 
Currently, there is no practical cryptanalytic attack on triple DES. [12 
assured that the cost of brute-force key search on triple DES is on the order 
of 2112 and it is estimated that the cost of the differential cryptanalysis grows 
exponentially, that is exceeding ICP. 
2.1.3 RSA 
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman at MIT designed the RSA scheme 
in 1978 [52]. It utilizes exponential functions as its expression and its security 
is based on the difficulty of factoring the product of two large prime numbers. 
RSA key pairs, where the public key consists of a modulus m and public 
exponent e while the private key consists of the same modulus m and a private 
exponent d. 
The two keys are generated from two randomly chosen large prime numbers, 
p and q. To assure maximum security, the lengths of these numbers should be 
equal. The modulus m is computed as the product of the two primes: 
m = p ^ q 
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Next, an encryption key e is chosen so that e and {p—l){q — l) are relatively 
prime. The decryption key d is chosen so that: 
ed 二 1 (mod {p - l){q - 1)) 
d 二 e—1 (mod (p-l)(q-l)) 
Let X be the plaintext with the same size as the modulus and y be the 
ciphertext. Then, the formulas for encryption and decryption are as follows: 
y — x^ mod m 
X = yd mod m 
For this algorithm to be satisfactory for public-key encryption, the following 
requirements must be met: 
• It is possible to find the values of e, d, m such that x^^ = x mod m for 
all X < m. 
• It is relatively easy to compute x^ and y^ for all values of x < y. 
• It is infeasible to determine d given e and m. 
2.1.4 Elliptic Curve 
The algorithm using the Elliptic curve is faster than RSA or DSA. With the 
same key size, the security level of Elliptic curve is higher. The obvious ad-
vantage of the elliptic curve in the implementation is that it does not require 
cryptographic co-processors and the smaller key size can save valuable memory 
space in the smart card. However, the elliptic curve is not widely applied in 
the smart card because RSA and DSA are more compatible with the existing 
PKI system such as SSL and certification authority. 
2.2 Smart Cards 
Smart Cards [60] [11] [6] [10] [1] are credit-card sized cards with processors 
built inside. Roughly speaking, smart cards can be categorized as memory 
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cards and microprocessor cards. Most of the earlier released smart cards are 
memory cards without processing power. They are widely used for the storage 
of data only. A Microprocessor card is a card with limited processing power 
and memory for the data storage. In general, it can be sub-classified as multi-
functional or specific-functional microprocessor cards. Figure 2.3 shows the 
class hierarchy of smart cards. Nowadays, multi-functional microprocessor 
cards have become dominant in the market since their release because they 









Figure 2.3: Class hierarchy of smart card 
At the same time, we can also divide the smart cards into contact or 
contact-less type. A card that is of contact type needs to be placed in the 
card acceptance device for use. A card that is of contact-less type must be 
put within certain distance around the card acceptance device without being 
placed in a card acceptance device. Still, a contact-less card is more expensive 
and less common than a card of contact type. 
In addition, the smart card is always equipped with the read-only memory 
(ROM), electrical erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) and 
random access memory (RAM). In order to perform cryptographic operations, 
a crypto-coprocessor can be embedded in the card to enhance the performance 
of the computational intensive operation such as modular arithmetic and large 
integer calculation. Figure 2.4 shows the physical architecture of the smart 
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card. 
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Figure 2.4: Example of physical architecture of smart card 
Smart Cards communicate with the attached host according to IS07816-4 
standard, that defines the application protocol between the smart card and 
host application. The card and the host can send an application protocol data 
unit (APDU) to each other for communications. The APDU sent from the 
host to the card is called command APDU while the APDU sent from the 
card to the host is called response APDU. Figure 2.5 describes the format of 
the command APDU and response APDU. For the command APDU, CLA, 
INS, PI and P2 are its header while the optional data field and Le form its 
body. For the response APDU, the optional data field forms its body while 
SWl and SW2 form its trailer. Table 2.1 shows the physical meaning of 
different fields in the APDU. 
Other than IS07816, many standards for the smart cards have been drafted 
and released including GSM, EMV, Open platform, OpenCard and PC/SC for 
different purposes and platforms. 
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Command APDU 
Mandatory Header Optional Body 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Optional Data Le 
Response APDU 
〇 P J 二 她 
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Optional Data SW1 SW2 
Figure 2.5: Format of Command APDU and Response APDU 
Field Length (byte) Meaning 
CLA 1 identifies the class of an instruction 
INS 1 identifies an instruction for a specific applet 
PI 1 passes command specific parameters to the command 
P2 1 passes command specific parameters to the command 
Lc 1 specifies the length of the optional data 
Le 1 specifies the length of the optional data in the corresponding response APDU 
SWl 1 specifies the the status code 
SW2 1 specifies the the meaning of the status code 
Table 2.1: Meaning of APDU header and trailer 
2.2.1 Smart Card Operating Systems 
In general, smart cards can be classified in terms of their operating systems, 
namely, file system smart cards, Java Cards, Multos, smart cards for windows. 
• File System Smart Card 
It is composed of the Elementary file (EF), Dedicated file (DF) and 
Master file (MF). They form a hierarchical file system. 
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• Multos [45: 
The smart card program written in Multos Executable Language (MEL) 
is run on top of the Application Abstraction Machine (AAM). 
• Smart Card for Windows [42: 
It is a combination of the traditional ISO 7816-4 compliant operating 
system and a programmable platform. The core provides a file system, 
access controls，cryptography services, an API and a selection of ISO 
commands. 
• Java Card 
The Java Card platform allows the application to be written in Java 
language. 
2.2.2 Java Card 
The Java Card [66] specification enables the on-card program to be written in 
Java and allows the on-card program to be run on smart cards and other devices 
with limited memory. Figure 2.6 shows the Java Card technology architecture. 
Nevertheless, there are many limitations on the Java Card platform as follows: 
1. Dynamic class loading is not supported. 
2. Garbage collection is not mandatory. 
3. Customized security manager is not supported. Security policies are 
implemented directly. 
4. Multiple threads are not supported in JVM. 
5. An object cannot be cloned. 
6. Package java.lang is not fully implemented on Java Card JVM. 
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7. Primitive types such as double, float and long are not available. The 
keyword int is optionally supported. 
8. Only one dimensional array is supported. 





Java Card API Extension 
Java Card VM 
OS Kernel 
J 
Figure 2.6: Java Card Technology Architecture 
Advantages of a Java Card 
Strictly speaking, the benefits of Java Card includes platform independence, 
multi-application capability, post-issuance, flexibility and compatibility with 
smart card standards. 
Java Card technology is platform-independent, enabling developers to use 
Java Card technology-based applets to run applications on different vendors' 
cards. Java Card technology has been designed fundamentally to be secure and 
multi-application capable. It provides a post-issuable feature, where applica-
tions can be securely loaded after the cards are issued, allowing card issuers 
to dynamically respond to the preferences of the card holder. 
Additionally, Java Card technology is compatible with existing smart card 
standards, such as formal international standards IS07816, and industry-
specific standards, such as Europay/MasterCard/Visa (EMV) and the Eu-
ropean Telecommunications Standards Institute 03.19 (ETSI 03.19). 
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2.3 Authentication Protocol 
When a registered system user logs into the system, the system initializes the 
authentication protocol with the login user. How does the system know that it 
is the registered user? There is a situation that a hostile user impersonates a 
registered user to login to the system. Authentication protocol is designed to 
resolve this problem. Typically, authentication can be performed with these 
approaches: 
• what a person knows 
Some examples are the password [37] [44], pin and hand-written signa-
ture. It is called one-factor authentication. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Easy to remember • Easy to leak out the password 
• Easy to modify the secret • Easy to intrude such systems 
• Easy to be confused when there are 
many passwords memorized by a user 
• Dependency of the security with the 
length of passwords or the complexity 
of the signature 
Table 2.2: Advantages and Disadvantages of one-factor authentication protocol 
• what a person has 
Credit card systems and ATM machines are examples of it, in which 
a person holds a user's specific password-protected card. It is called 
two-factor authentication. 
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Advantages Disadvantages 
• Not able to be forged without expen- • Only applicable to local access or se-
sive equipment cure network systems 
• Being protected by a password so that 
only stealing the card cannot access the 
system 
Table 2.3: Advantages and Disadvantages of two-factor authentication protocol 
• what a person is (Biometrics) 
Human has some unique inborn features such as the retina pattern and 
fingerprint. These features can be used for the identification of a person. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Extremely difficult to be falsified • Expensive to equip with sophisticated 
retina and fingerprint readers 
• System failure when the retina or fin-
gerprint data are lost 
Table 2.4: Advantages and Disadvantages of biometric-based authentication 
protocol 
2.3.1 Properties 
Central to the authentication protocol, the following requirements [51] [27 
must be achieved: 
• Mutual Authentication 
It is an important property that enables the involved parties to identify 
themselves mutually and establish a secret session key. Traditionally, the 
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authentication protocol only considers the user authentication. Nowa-
days, this design practice can lead to the potential intrusion into the user 
host by the forged authentication server. 
• Confidentiality 
All messages should be transmitted in the encrypted form to prevent 
the masquerade and compromise of secret session keys. Otherwise, a 
plaintext message can be grabbed with a simple sniffer program and 
interpreted directly. 
• Timelessness 
The protocol is able to resist message replay attacks, which could lead 
to the compromise of a session key or the impersonation of another user. 
Replay attack can be classified in different types [26] as follows: 
• Simple replay 
• Repetition that can be logged 
• Repetition that cannot be detected 
• Backward replay without modification 
2.3.2 Survey 
Authentication protocols can be classified as local and remote authentications. 
Local authentication [54] [15] is used for local access within a secure network 
while remote authentication is used for remote access in an open network. We 
focus on remote authentication systems with the collaboration of the smart 
card and public key infrastructure. 
Many smart card based remote authentication protocols have been pro-
posed. In 1991, reference [9] described a remote authentication protocol mak-
ing use of smart cards. This protocol allows the server to verify the password 
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without storing the password in the server. This protocol can also tackle the 
replaying attack by using time-stamps. Nonetheless, it was later discovered [8 
that anyone who possesses the public information in the network could derive 
some of the secret keys of the password generation center. A hostile party can 
therefore impersonate a legal user in a subsequent login. 
In 1993, Chang et al. [7] proposed another authentication protocol based 
on Shamir's algorithm for the signature scheme. All messages transmitted 
have included the time-stamps to resist replaying attacks. This protocol does 
not require the authentication server to store the password. However, this 
protocol does not allow the user to change the password unless the username 
is changed as well since the password is dependent on the username according 
to a predefined formula. It makes this protocol too impractical to apply to 
real systems. 
Later, Lee and Kim [38] proposed a remote authentication protocol in 1998. 
More precisely, it is called mutual authentication protocol. This protocol in-
corporates the challenge-response protocol into public key techniques. The 
card generates a digest according to the username and smart card identifica-
tion number. The digest is sent to the authentication server and compared 
with the digest computed in the server. Obviously, the digest may be sent to 
the fraudulent authentication server even though it is sent through a secure 
channel. After that, the fraudulent server can impersonate the legal user to 
access the authentication server successfully. 
Recently, Hwang and Li [35] proposed a new remote authentication protocol 
based on EIGamal's public key crypto-system in 2000. The authentication 
server does not need to store the password for each user, and this protocol can 
withstand replaying attacks. However, this protocol does not support mutual 
authentication. At the same time, the user password cannot be changed unless 
the username is changed as [7] proposed in 1993. 
On the other hand, a local collaborative authentication protocol by using 
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fingerprint verification was proposed by Moon [43] to verify the ownership of 
a smart card in 2000. It is considered as a highly secure measure to guaran-
tee that only the valid user can activate the authorized card. However, this 
authentication system cannot be used for the remote authentication that is 
common in the e-commerce system. It provides no guarantees that only the 
correct user can login to the correct remote authentication server, ignores of 
the key distribution scheme and does not handle the failure of the system [58 
40] [30:. 
In general, we can characterize the remote authentication protocol accord-
ing to the features listed as follows: 
1. Resist time attacks 
2. Store the user password for verification in the server 
3. Use a formula to verify the user identity 
4. Authenticate the client only 
5. Authenticate the client and the server mutually 
6. Password cannot be changed once it is assigned to a user 
Table 2.5 summarizes the characteristics of these protocols. 
Protocol Resistance to Storage of the Storage of the User authenti- Mutual au- Fixed password 
replay attacks user password formula cation thentication  
[9] Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
[7] Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
[38] No Yes No Yes Yes No 
[35] Yes No Yes Yes ^  
Table 2.5: Characteristics of different remote authentication protocols 
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2.4 Transaction Protocol 
Transaction protocols describe the methodology for the exchange of payments 
and goods. The security concern of the transaction protocol will be examined. 
Generally, different payment systems [2] [4] [34] [62] [63] [49] may have dif-
ferent requirements from the transaction protocol. Typically, they are always 
characterized by the properties such as integrity, authorization, confidentiality, 
availability and reliability. 
(^^^^Seller^ Deposit 1 Acquirer 
分 -1 g § 
z CD ^ ！: 
^ 3 « ！2 
� < 
I Wi!TT"arawn �I S S U e r 
Figure 2.7: General Payment Model 
Integrity 
The protocol guarantees that the payment transferred cannot been modified 
and it can only be deposited to a dedicated party. 
Authorization 
It is of paramount importance that the protocol disallows the receipt of pay-
ments without explicit authorization. Reference [2] generalizes the method for 
authorization into three types. 
• Out-band authorization 
• Password authorization 
• Signature authorization 
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Confidentiality 
Confidentiality of a message ensures that the unrelated parties in the protocol 
would not be able to read the message. A message can only be read by the 
participants of the protocol system. 
Availability 
It ensures that the buyer and seller can always make or receive payments 
whenever necessary. 
Reliability 
Obviously, the protocol must be free from hanging in unknown or inconsistent 
state. Both the buyer and seller will not suffer a loss of property in case of 
protocol failures. On the other hand, the protocol can perform recovery from 
failures. 
2.5 BAN Logic 
BAN logic [5], named by its founders M. Burrows, M. Abadi and R. Need-
ham, is popularly applied to the analysis of protocols for authentication in 
distributed systems. It provides the formalism [48] [16] that allows a protocol 
to prove the true presence of each party to the others, and to check the redun-
dancy as well as the security problems. The notation and logical postulates of 
the BAN logic are outlined in the following sections. 
2.5.1 Notation 
The symbols A, B and S denote the specific principles. Kab, Kas and i^ bs 
denote the specific shared keys. Ka, Kb and Ks denote the specific public 
keys, i^a—i,机-1 and denote the corresponding private key. Na, N^ and 
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Nc denote the specific statements. The symbols P, Q and R represent the 
principles. The statements were represented by X and Y. K represents the 
encryption key. These notations are used as either meta-symbols or as the free 
variables with an implicit universal quantification. 
The proposition is connected by the conjunction, denoted by a comma. 
Conjunction has the properties of associativity and commutativity. In addition 
to the conjunction, we use the following connective expression: 
• P I 三；^ 
P believes X , or P would be entitled to believe X . In particular, the 
principal P may act as though X is true. This operator is central to 
logic. 
• P < X 
P sees X. P receives a message from a principal and can read and repeat 
X in that message. 
• P I - X 
P has said X. P has sent X，but it does not contain the information 
of when this message was sent. However, it is known that P believed X 
when P sent X. 
.P X 
P has jurisdiction over X. In other words, P has the authority on X. 
Similar situation such as the certification authority has jurisdiction to 
say which certificate (public key) of a person is. 
• 
The message X is fresh. This message has not appeared before the 
current round of the protocol. Nonce is one example of such a message. 
It usually includes a time-stamp or message sequence number. 
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• P ^ Q 
P and K use the shared key K for the communication. The shared key 
K is only known to P and Q, or a principle trusted by either P or Q. 
K 
• I— P: 
P has a public key K. The corresponding private key will not be 
known by any principal except P, or principals trusted by P. 
X 
• P # Q 
The formula X is a secret known only to P and Q. P and Q can use X 
to prove their identities to one another. An example of a shared secret 
is a password. 
This represents that X is encrypted under the key K. 
• < X >Y 
This represents that X has combined with the formula Y and it is in-
tended that y is a secret, and its presence proves the identity of whoever 
says < X > y . 
2.5.2 Logical Postulates 
Now, we introduce the logical postulates to provide enough machinery to carry 
out the analysis of authentication protocols. 
• Rule 1: Message-meaning rule 
It concerns the interpretation of plaintext messages, encrypted messages 
and messages with secret. It is used to derive the beliefs about the origin 
of messages. The formula below is postulated for shared keys. 
P \= Q ^ P, P < {X}k 
P \= Q X 
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Similarly, the formula for public keys is postulated like this: 
K 
P 1= Q, P < 
P I 三 Q I 〜 X 
The formula for shared secrets is postulated like this: 
P \= Q ^ P, P < <X>Y 
P I 三 Q I �X 
• Rule 2: Nonce-verification 
It ensures that the message is fresh and the sender still believes it. 
P I三 tl(X), P \= Q X 
P Q \= X 
• Rule 3: Jurisdiction 
It states that if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X , then P trusts 
Q on the truth of X\ 
P Q X, P \= Q \= X 
P X 
• Rule 4: A necessary property of the belief operator 
P believes a set of statements if and only if P believes each individual 
statement separately. 
P \= X, P \=Y P I三（X, Y) P 1= Q 1= ( X , Y) 
P I三 ( X , Y) P 1= X P \=Q\= X 
• Rule 5: Similar rule is applied to the operator | � 
P I三 Q 卜（X, F ) 
P I 三 Q I 〜 X 
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• Rule 6: A principal sees a formula, then he also sees its components, 
provided that he knows the necessary keys. 
P < ( X , Y) P < <X>Y P \= Q ^ P, P < {X}K 
P < X P < X P < X 
K K 
P I三 P，P < {X}k p 1= Q, P < 
P < X P < X 
• Rule 7: Freshness of a formula 
If one part of a formula is known to be fresh, the entire formula must be 
fresh. 
P I 三 t t � 
p I三 tt(x,y) 
• Rule 8: If a key is used between a pair of principals in both directions, 
the following formulas can describe this property. 
P \三 R 艮 R, P \= Q = R^ 
P \三R!艮R P |三Q I三R丨艮R 
• Rule 9: If a secret is used between a pair of principals in both directions, 
the following two rules can reflect this property. 
P \三 R I R, P I三 Q I三 $ 
P \= R' ^ R P \= Q R^ ^ R 
With the postulates, we can construct the proofs in the logic. Starting from 
a formula X , we can prove the validity of Y if there is a sequence of formula 
Zq, ...Zn, where Zq — X , Zn — Y, and each Z^+i can be obtained from Zi by 
the application of the mentioned logical postulates. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 25 
2.5.3 Protocol Analysis 
Principally, a protocol is analyzed with the following procedures: 
1. The protocol to be analyzed is converted from its informal form into the 
formalized logical statements. 
2. The assumptions about the initial state are stated. 
3. The assertions for each statement about the state of the system are 
devised. 
4. The logical postulates are applied to the protocol step-by-step, in order 
to derive the conclusion. 
Chapter 3 
Authentication Protocol 
With the advance of the smart card technology and growing demand for secure 
applications in the community, many researches are being done on smart-card 
based systems from in-house applications to the Internet applications. 
In this section, we will propose our design of the smart-card based authenti-
cation protocol and silent key distribution scheme with the failure handling for 
the ordinary application service provider. Compared with other similar proto-
cols, our protocol not only can resist replaying attacks, but also can perform a 
mutual authentication, and handle smart card or server failures properly. The 
protocol can be incorporated into biometric-based or password-based systems. 
Formal analysis of our protocol with BAN logic will be detailed to show its 
correctness. Finally, the implementation with the Java card and the experi-
mental result will also be described. 
3.1 Formulation of Problem 
When we have remote access to an application service provider, the choice of 
the authentication mechanism is very crucial to the security of the system. 
Without deliberate consideration to the design of the authentication protocol, 
serious defects of the authentication system would be induced and harmful to 
the service provider and other system users. 
26 
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The choice of the password-based authentication system cannot simply 
resolve the challenges from the intruders. As mentioned before, the hostile 
party can always impersonate a user by the brute-force password search in the 
password domain. The password can also be stolen more easily compared with 
other approaches. 
Another solution is the biometric based authentication system. It is gen-
erally applied to local access systems or secure networks. Obviously, it cannot 
be applied to remote access system because of the unrecoverable failure of 
biometric-based systems. Just imagine what would happen when the finger-
print data of a person is stolen, say in the remote authentication process. Still, 
the intruder can impersonate the user to log in the system with the stolen fin-
gerprint data. Anyway, the user can replace the fingerprint data with another 
fingerprint, but what would happen when all ten fingerprint data are stolen? 
Unlike password-based or PKI systems, in which the password or the certificate 
can be regenerated easily, it is fatal that the biometric based system cannot 
handle data loss failures. 
3.2 The New Idea 
We propose the one-way function based authentication protocol with the col-
laboration of the smart cards and public key infrastructure. 
Inspired by the idea of [17] [3], we use a pair of one-way hash function f 
and F to send a secret to another party for the verification without disclosing 
the secret. The authentication data are hashed with f and salted with a time-
stamp [29]. The generated hash value can be verified by another party who 
holds F. 
Definition: f is of the form f.G^G where G is a domain where we can 
test the membership, compute the inverse and group operation, sample from 
a nearly uniform distribution efficiently. There is a constraint applied on / : 
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Figure 3.1: System Diagram of the Authentication System 
G ^ G, that is 
F{xJ{y))^f{x^y) for x ^ 1 (3.1) 
Several parties are involved in this protocol as shown in figure 3.1. Consider 
the scenario that the client host attached with the card reader is trying to login 
to the remote application server to access some services. Certification authority 
and the time server will participate in the protocol. 
• Client Host 
It initializes the authentication protocol by activating the card applet 
and communicating with the application server. 
• Java Card 
It has a built-in finite state machine to handle the request from the client 
host and make a suitable response. 
• Application Server 
It handles the client request for accessing some services. 
參 Database Server 
It stores user's information partly for the authentication. 
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• Certification Authority 
It stores, distributes and issues the certificate of the service subscribers 
and the application service provider. 
• Time Server 
It distributes its current GMT time. 
3.3 Assumptions 
We hereby assume that the certification authority and the time server are 
trustable and can always give us the valid data according to the request. Also, 
the communication channel between the card and client host is protected by 
the PKI，which is commonly provided in the smart card system. The PKI 
protection is also available to the communication channel between the database 
server and application server. At last, we assume that the communication 
channel between the client host and application server is protected. 
3.4 Trust Model 
A trust model is used to describe how the entity in a protocol can trust another 
entity. With the trust model, we can determine who can be trusted by someone 
when some constraint(s) is/are satisfied. The trust model of the card, client 
and application are defined as follows: 
• Trust 1 
The card and server believe that only the one who can show the valid 
password/biometric data is the legal user. 
• Trust 2 
The client and server believe that only subscriber's card can sign the 
message with his private key. 
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• Trust 3 
The card believes that only the application server can generate the cor-
rect digest with the card-specific F. 
參 Trust 4 
The application server believes that only the card can generate the cor-
rect digest with the card-specific f. 
3.5 Protocol 
In general, our protocol is divided into three phases. 
• Registration Phase 
The subscriber is issued with an authorized smart card. 
• Local Authentication Phase 
The card and local host are mutually authenticated. 
• Remote Authentication Phase 
The card and application server are mutually authenticated and a shared 
session key is established on the card and application server without the 
knowledge of the client. 
When the service subscriber initializes the protocol, the subscriber must be 
issued with the authorized smart card in advance. This can be done when the 
subscriber approaches to the card center to formally apply for a service and 
the card. 
3.5.1 Registration 
In the registration phase, the subscriber will be assigned an authorized smart 
card. The subscriber should go to the card center to prove his identity. Then 
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the following steps will be taken as shown in figure 3.2 to issue the smart card. 
The sequence of the protocol is indicated in the circle on the top left corner of 
each text box in the figure. 
1. A card applet is loaded onto the card and customized with the pass-
word/biometric data. 
2. A pair of RSA keys, functions / and F are generated on card. 
3. The RSA public key and F are downloaded from the card. 
4. The RSA public key downloaded from the card is used to generate a self-
signed certificate, which is further signed by the certification authority 
while F is stored in the corresponding user-entry in the database. 
5. The purse in the card is activated. 
3.5.2 Local Authentication 
As mentioned before, the subscriber can only access the service provided by the 
application server with an authorized card. Before the subscriber can access 
the desired service, the local authentication must be performed successfully. 
A client program runs on behalf of the subscriber to help the subscriber to 
execute the authentication procedure. Figure 3.3 illustrates how the local 
authentication is done. The card and client can identify each other after this 
phase. 
We describe the protocol as a sequence of rounds, which consists of a num-
ber of messages. The notation X Y : M is used to describe that message 
M is sent from X to Y. For the interest of brevity, the messages transmitted 
are assumed private and signed by the corresponding party. 
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Figure 3.2: Registration 
Chapter 3 Authentication Protocol 33 
Formally, the subscriber supplies the login information login in Ml , say 
password or biometric data，in step 5 to the host which further sends to the 
card. 
Host Applet : user name, login, time t (Ml) 
The card receives the message and verifies its content in step 6. Upon the 
successful verification, the card generates the authentication data in step 7 
and sends M2 to the host in step 8 for remote access of the application server. 
Otherwise, the card sends a failure signal to the host and halts the execution. 
Applet Host : user name, f {random number X), time t (M2) 
3.5.3 Remote Authentication 
When the card and host are ready, the remote authentication can be carried 
out to enable the subscriber to access the services. Figure 3.4 illustrates the 
mechanism of the remote authentication protocol. The interactions with the 
certification authority and time server are not shown in the figure for simplicity. 
The card, client and application server would have been authenticated by each 
other after this phase. 
The username, time t and hashed random number f {random number X) 
attached in M3 (defined below) are sent to the remote application server in 
step 1. They are for the calculation of the hashed value by the application 
server. 
Host Server : username, /{random number X), time t (M3) 
When the server has received the message, the user's F would be re-
trieved from the database and used for the computation of the hash value 
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Figure 3.3: Local authentication protocol 
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F{time t, f {randome number X)) in step 5. Time t' and the hash value are 
sent in M4 to the host for the user authentication. 
Server -> Host : F{time t, f [randome number X)), time t' (M4) 
The host would forward the received message M5 to the card upon correct 
signature verification of the message in step 8. 
Host Applet : F{time t, /{random number X ) ) , time t' (M5) 
The card applet checks the validity of the hashed value in step 10. After 
correct verification in step 11, the card computes the hashed value for the 
server. The computed hash value M6 is sent to the server in steps 12 and 13. 
Otherwise, a failure signal is sent and the protocol is halted. 
Applet -> Host : f{time t' * random number X) (M6) 
Applet —)• Host : /{time t' * random number X) (M7) 
When the server receives the forward message from the host, it checks the 
correctness of the hashed value in step 14. For the correct matching of the 
hash value, the remote authentication protocol is terminated successfully and 
a secret session key is formed in step 15. 
3.5.4 Silent Key Distribution Scheme 
Once the authentication protocol is completed successfully, a shared secret key 
would be built in the card and application server without the knowledge of the 
client program. Afterwards, this key can be used for the subsequent secure 
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communication between the card and application server when the confidential 
information is being sent between them. 
The card builds the secret key for triple DES algorithm [57] by using three 
data sets obtained from the protocol: 
肌 f{{t' - 1) * X ) , f ( ( t - l ) * X ) 
Meanwhile, the application server constructs the secret key according to 
three data sets collected from the protocol: 
f ( X ) , F ( ( t ' - 1 ) , f ( X ) ) , F ( ( t - 1 ) , f ( X ) ) 
3.5.5 Advantages 
By and large, our protocol has the following features and improvements on the 
existing smart-card based remote authentication protocol. 
1. Higher security measures by the mutual authentication 
2. Complement the biometric-based protocol 
3. Resistance to replaying attacks by using time-stamp token 
4. Silent key distribution scheme for the applet and server 
5. Resist the ordinary physical and remote attacks 
6. Independence of the username from the password 
7. Better smart card failure handling because different user has different / ; 
better server failure handling because F cannot generate f{x) given x 
8. Suitableness to apply on password-based or biometric-based systems, 
wireless and Internet-based e-commerce service servers 
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3-6 BAN Logic Analysis 
Formally, the following notations are used in the proof. denotes that 
the message M is signed with the private key of A. denotes that the 
message M is encrypted with the shared key of A and B. 
Symbol Meaning 
ID Username 
PWD Password or biometric data 
X Random number 
t Time generated by the time server 
t' Time generated by the time server 
Kah Shared key of Applet and Host 
Kh s Shared key of Host and Server 
Kas Shared key of Applet and Server 
Kj^-i Private Key of Applet 
Kg- i Private key of Server 
Table 3.1: Notations used in the proof 
Step 1 - Formalize Protocol 
The messages transmitted in the protocol are listed as follows: 
• Ml: Host -> Applet 
The message is encrypted with the shared secret key of the applet and 
the host. The password is included in this message as the critical login 
information that is only known by the applet and host. 
PWD 
{ID, Applet ^ Host, t, it}KAH (Ml) 
• M2: Applet Host 
The message is signed with the private key of the applet and is encrypted 
with the shared key of the applet and host. 
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{ID, {{Applet 卜 / ( X ) ) , t, mK^-AK^H (M2) 
參 M3: Host Server 
Message M2 is decrypted with the shared secret key of the applet and 
host. The decrypted message is encrypted with the shared key of the 
host and the server. The encrypted message is then forwarded to the 
server. 
{ID, {Applet 卜 f(X), t ， ( M 3 ) 
• M4: Server Host 
The message contains the required hash value F{t, f{X)) for the server 
authentication and the generated parameter for the subsequent user au-
thentication. 
{{Applet 邓，為 S e r v e r , 財 丑 , (M4) 
• M5: Host -> Applet 
The host re-encodes the message M4 with the shared key of the applet 
and host. 
{{Applet ⑷）Server, t', (M5) 
• M6: Applet Host 
The applet computes the required hash value from the server and signs 
it with the private key of the applet. 
f(t' * X) , 
{{Applet ^ Server} (M6) 
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• M7: Host Server 
The host re-encodes the message M6 which is then forwarded to the 
server. After successful user authentication, a shared secret session key 
would be established on the server and applet. 
* X) 
{{Applet ^ Server}K^-AKHs (M7) 
Step 2 - State Initial Assumptions 
There are some axioms made before the initialization of the protocol. Shared 
secret key Kah is established between the applet and the host (axiom 1) while 
Khs is established between the host and the server (axiom 2). The applet 
has Ka as the public key (axiom 3) while the server has Ks as the public key 
(axiom4). The applet, host and the server believes the certificate issued by 
the certification authority, i.e. the applet, host and server believe Ka is the 
public key of the applet (axioms 5，6 and 7); the host and the server believe 
Ks is the public key of the server (axioms 8, 9). 
Applet 弹 Host (Axiom 1) 
Host K啓 Server (Axiom 2) 
Ka 
Applet (Axiom 3) 
Ks 
—Server (Axiom 4) 
KA 
Applet I 三 Applet (Axiom 5) 
Ka 
Host I 三 Applet (Axiom 6) 
Ka 
Server | 三 Applet (Axiom 7) 
Ks 
Host I 三 Server (Axiom 8) 
Ks 
Server | 三 Server (Axiom 9) 
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As for the hash functions / and F, it is well-known that the server has 
the access to the hash value of F(M) for any message M (axioms 12 and 13) 
while the applet has the access to the hash value of / ( M ) for any message M 
(axioms 10 and 11). The applet and host have the password or biometric data 
as the shared secret (axiom 14). The server and applet believe the time server 
(axioms 15 and 16). 
Applet I三 \Jx.[Applet | � f{x)] (Axiom 10) 
Server |三 / ( x ) ] (Axiom 11) 
Applet I三 V:r.[S^eri;er F(x)] (Axiom 12) 
Server | 三 F { x ) ] (Axiom 13) 
PWD . . . . .s 
Applet ^ Host (Axiom 14) 
Applet I 三 U (Axiom 15) 
Server |三 j力' (Axiom 16) 
Step 3 - Devise Assertion and Execute Proof 
By the application of rule 1 (please refer to the logical postulates stated in 
chapter 2), axiom 1, the applet sees the valid password supplied by the host 
(A3), which is the secret known only by the applet and card holder. In other 
words, the applet believes the presence of the card holder according to the 
trust model. By the trust model and jurisdiction rule, the applet believes that 
the time t is fresh. 
Host I � ( A l ) 
Applet > PWD (A2) 
Applet I 三 Host I �P W D (by rule 1 and axiom 1) (A3) 
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The applet generates a hash value from a random value and sends the signed 
message to the host, which sends to the server. When the server receives the 
message, it believes that it is the applet's login request (A7) since the correct 
hash value is signed with the applet's private key (A5) and its time-stamp is 
fresh (axiom 16). Then, the server computes the requested digested value for 
the applet and starts the user authentication. With the freshness of t and rule 
7, the server is convinced that the request message is sent recently and is not 
a replay of an old message. 
Server O f{x) (by rule 6 and axiom 2) (A4) 
Server |三 Applet | � / ( > ) (by rule 1 and A4) (A5) 
Server |三 Applet \ � t (by rule 1 and axiom 2) (A6) 
Server | 三 Applet | 三 f{x) (by axiom 16 and A15) (A7) 
The host forwards the message with the digested value F(t, f{x)) to the 
applet. The applet finds that the hash value F{t, f{x)) is matched with 
f{t * X) by the definitions of f and F. Similarly, by the application of the 
nonce-verification rule, the authentication request is fresh and not a replaying 
message. 
Since the applet can see and verify the hash value F{t, f{x)) correctly, we 
can conclude that the applet believes the true identity of the server (CI) by 
the jurisdiction rule and corrected hash value. Then, the applet generates the 
requested hash value f{t' * X) and sends to the server via the host for the 
user authentication. 
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Applet O f{x)) (by rule 6 and axiom 2) (A8) 
Applet I三 Server | �F { t , f{x)) (by rule 1 and A7) (A9) 
Applet I三 Server |三 F(t, f{x)) (by A8，rule 2 and axiom 15) (CI) 
Applet I三 Server | �t ' (by rule 1) (AlO) 
When the server receives the information, it checks the correctness of the 
hash value. Since f{t丨 * X) is equal to F{t', f{x)) and the applet is convinced 
that the reply message is fresh, the user authentication is passed (C2) according 
to the jurisdiction rule and nonce-verification rule. 
Server > F{f, f{x)) (by rule 6 and axiom 2) (A l l ) 
Server |三 Applet 卜 F{t', f{x)) (by rule 1 and A l l ) (Al2) 
Server |三 Applet |三 f{x)) (by A12, rule 2 and axiom 16) (C2) 
Step 4 - Draw Conclusions 
Finally, a shared secret key is established between the server and applet (C3 
and C4) since the server and host know the true presence of each other (CI 
and C2) after validating the authentication data. 
Applet I三 Applet Server (by CI) (C3) 
Server |三 Applet 效 Server (by C2) (C4) 
3.7 Experimental Evaluation 
This section describes the experimental result we have done for the evaluation 
of the proposed authentication protocol. 
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Figure 3.5: Testing environment 
3.7.1 Configuration 
The development environment is based on GemXpresso rapid application de-
velopment toolkit 211 version 2.4 with the GemXpresso 211PKis Java card. 
This Java card is implemented according to Java Card 2.1 API and Java Card 
2.1 VM [31] [11] with triple DES and RSA algorithms [57:. 
Various APIs are used for writing the test program. They include Java 
Core API 1.2.2, Java Card 2.1, Java Cryptography Extension 1.2.1, Java Se-
cure Socket Extension 1.0.2’ Opencard 1.2, Gemplus Card Service and Open 
Platform. 
The experimental environment is setup as shown in figure 3.5. 
The implementation of hash functions f and F is based on the exponential 
expression as expressed in Hash 1 and Hash 2. 
It is assumed that G = Z^* where AT is a product of two large distinct 
prime numbers. By definition, f and F have the following expressions: 
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f{x) = mod N (Hash 1) 
F{x, y) = x'^ ^ y mod N (Hash 2) 
It can be proved that f{y)) = f{x * y). 
3.7.2 Performance Analysis 
In order to evaluate the authentication protocol in term of the speed, we have 
performed the following experiments for testing. 
• Measurement of the authentication time with different PCs 
• Measurement of the on-card and off-card computation times in the au-
thentication 
• Measurement of the authentication time with different servers 
• Measurement of the scalability of the authentication server 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment, we have tested the authentication time in different ma-
chines. We have tested the authentication protocol with 333MHz PC, 500MHz 
PC and 667MHz PC. Figure 3.6 shows the corresponding results and table 3.2 
shows its corresponding statistical results. 
From the observation, the faster the speed of the CPU is, the faster the au-
thentication speed is. In general, the authentication can always be completed 
within 3100 ms. However, the authentication time does not decrease linearly 
with the speed of the CPU. Therefore, we measure the on-card and off-card 
computation time in experiment 2 and measure the effect of the sever to the 
authentication time in experiment 3. 
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Authentication time on PC with different CPUs 
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Figure 3.6: Authentication time with different hosts 
Host CPU (MHz) 333MHz 500MHz 667MHz 
OS Windows 98 SE Windows 98 SE Windows 98 SE 
Average Time (ms) 3934 3801 3229 
Standard Deviation 283 73 93 
Maximum Time (ms) 5060 3900 3630 
Minimum Time (ms) 3680 3670 3130 
Table 3.2: Statistical result of the authentication time with different hosts 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we have measured the on-card and off-card computation 
in each authentication. The client host has 667MHz CPU and 128M RAM 
running on windows 98 SE platform. Figure 3.7 shows the experimental result 
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On-card and Off-card computation time in authentication 
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Figure 3.7: On-card and off-card computation time in authentication 
in graph and table 3.3 shows the statistical result of this experiment. 
Obviously, the off-card computation time only takes 17.2% of the total 
authentication time while the on-card computation time is 2677 ms, which 
takes 82.8% of the total authentication time. In other words, however fast 
the client and server CPUs are, the fastest time cannot be less than 2600 ms. 
The reason for the long on-card computation time is because of the relatively 
slow speed of the optimized RSA signature generation and verification. The 
software implementation of the one-way hash function f also introduces certain 
degree of time overhead. 
Chapter 3 Authentication Protocol 48 
On-card Off-card Total 
Average Time (ms) 2677 558 3235 
Standard Deviation 38 67 69 
Maximum Time (ms) 2750 720 3350 
Minimum Time (ms) 2590 440 3130 
Table 3.3: Statistical result of the on-card and off-card authentication time 
Experiment 3 
In this experiment, we have evaluated how the performance of the authenti-
cation protocol varies with the authentication server. Figure 3.8 shows the 
experimental results and table 3.4 shows the corresponding statistical results. 
The client host has 500MHz CPU and 128M RAM running on windows 98 SE 
platform. 
It is observed that the performance of the server would not change the 
authentication time significantly and can be negligible when the server CPU 
has speed more than 333MHz as the authentication times on the 333MHz 
server and 12400MHz server are very close in average with less than 0.001% 
fluctuation. 
There are two reasons for this observation. First, most of the time is spent 
on the card and the off-card computation is negligible. Second, the most time 
consuming operations are RSA signature generation and verification which 
have already been optimized. The performance results are similar on the server 
with CPUs faster than 333MHz. 
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Authentication time with different servers 
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Figure 3.8: Authentication time with different servers 
Server CPU (MHz) 333 270 12400 
Server OS Windows 98 SE Solaris 2.6 Solaris 7.0 
Average Time (ms) 3361 3791 3335 
Standard Deviation 136 61 65 
Maximum Time (ms) 3680 3900 3520 
Minimum Time (ms) 3180 3680 3240 
Table 3.4: Statistical result of authentication time with different servers 
Experiment 4 
In this experiment, we determine the scalability of the authentication server 
by simulating a number of authentication request from clients. A number of 
authentication request is sent to the server at the same time and we record 
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Measurement of the scalability of the authentication server 
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Figure 3.9: Authentication time with different servers 
the time to complete all requests by the server. Four cases are considered as 
shown in table 3.5 (the row indicates the client while the column indicates the 
server): 
SunUltra 5/270 Sun Enterprise E4500 
SunUltra 5/270 case 1 case 2 
Sun Enterprise E4500 case 3 case 4 
Table 3.5: Cases to be studied 
In general, the time to complete all the authentication requests grows lin-
early with the number of the request. 
Chapter 4 
Transaction Protocol 
Transaction protocols handle the exchange of payments and products. Before 
the transaction protocol can be initialized, the negotiation protocol should be 
completed for making the compromise on the payment and product between 
the involved parties. On the other hand, the product delivery protocol will be 
started when the transaction protocol is done. 
The study of the micro-payment transaction is motivated by the high cost 
of credit card transactions. Practically, credit card transactions are only ap-
plicable when the amount of money involved is large because of the relatively 
high cost for each transaction. It is also inappropriate to perform credit card 
transactions on the web-based system in case that the network is insecure or 
the credit card information is misused by the seller. 
The transaction protocol should have the following characteristics: 
• Low cost for micro-payments 
• Privacy and anonymity of the parties 
• Recoverable transaction if it is broken 
• Appropriate conflict resolution policy based on digital signatures 
• The seller cannot find the identity of the buyer 
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• Money can be transferred amongst the buyer, seller, bank and application 
service provider 
• Secured by smart cards and PKI 
In this chapter, we introduce the proposed transaction protocol based on 
our authentication protocol. We first state the assumptions and list out the 
protocol in detail. The conflict resolution, justification and evaluation are 
outlined in the rest of this chapter. 
4.1 Assumptions 
As the transaction protocol is based on the authentication protocol, it is as-
sumed that the authentication protocol is completed successfully and a triple 
DES key is established between the card and payment gateway, which is built 
on top of the authentication server. Hence, the transaction message is en-
crypted and authenticated. 
The scenario for the transaction is shown in figure 4.1. The payment gate-
way handles the transaction request from the buyer. The seller server can 
handle the request from the payment gateway and buyers. 
Additionally, we assume that the transaction record has different fields as 
shown in figure 4.2. time stores the time of the transaction. The identity 
of the seller is stored in merchantCode while the product ID is stored in 
productCode. note describes the product in detail. Moreover, group is used 
for the product classification. For handling recovery, isComplete is used to 
indicate whether this transaction has been completed or not while is Empty is 
used to indicate whether this record is empty or not. 
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Figure 4.1: Testing environment 
class Transaction 
{ 
private Calendar time; 
private String merchantCode; 
private String productCode; 
private int amount; 
private String note; 
private String group; 
private boolean isComplete; 
private boolean isEmpty; 
} 
Figure 4.2: Class of Transaction 
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1. It is assumpted that the the local and remote authentication have been performed sucessfully. 
2. Transaction record has fields TIME, SELLER, PRODUCT, DESCRIPTION, GROUP, COST 
Figure 4,3: Flow diagram of the transaction protocol 
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4.2 Protocol 
Intuitively, the buyer and seller compromise on the product and payments 
by the negotiation protocol. Then, the buyer initializes the transaction pro-
tocol and makes a request to the payment gateway. The gateway sends an 
acknowledgement to the seller, who then sends another acknowledgement to 
the gateway. After receiving the acknowledgement from the seller, the gateway 
sends the signed token to the buyer. The buyer can use the signed token to 
initialize the product delivery protocol for getting the product and receipt. 
Figure 4.3 shows the flow diagram of the transaction protocol. The se-
quence of the transaction protocol is indicated in the circle on the top left 
corner of each text box in the figure. The following notations are deployed in 
this section: 
• Kah denotes the secret key between the applet and host. 
• Khs denotes the secret key between the host and payment gateway. 
• Kas denotes the secret key between the applet and payment gateway. 
• KSeller dcnotes the public key of the seller server. 
• Ks denotes the public key of the payment gateway. 
Transaction protocol is initialized by the client in the host. When the client 
wants to buy a desired item, the client host gets the transaction record for this 
item in step 1. Next, the host sends the transaction record M l to the applet 
on the card in step 2. 
Host Applet : M l = {Transaction}Kah 
After checking the validity of the transaction, the card sends the encrypted 
and signed transaction record M2 to the remote payment gateway via the 
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client host in step 8. At the same time, money is temporary deducted from 
the card in step 6. 
Applet Gateway : M2 二 {{Transaction)AS 
The payment gateway verifies the signature and the validity of the product 
record in the received transaction record. If the record is verified successfully, 
the gateway will generate a unique token Token which is a signed message 
with the transaction record, acknowledgement from the seller and a random 
generated number. Message M3 is sent to the seller server without the seller 
acknowledgement. Then, the seller server sends the signed acknowledgement 
to the gateway. After receiving the acknowledgement from the seller server, 
the gateway sends message M4 to the client host. The token is used to allow 
the seller server and client host to identify each other in the product deliv-
ery protocol. When the host receives the purchase acknowledgement from the 
gateway in step 16, the debit operation can be committed ultimately in step 
18 and the applet can send the token to the host . 
Gateway Seller Server : M3 = {{Transaction, Token}Kg.i}Kseiier 
Gateway Applet : M4 = {{Transaction, Token}K^_^}KAs 
Concurrently, the token will be verified and the local token database will be 
updated when the seller server receives the token from the gateway in step 12. 
Finally, the client host uses the received token to get the product from the 
seller in the product delivery phase. 
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Transaction Recovery 
In case of any abnormal transaction termination before the commitment of 
transactions in the applet, money that is temporary deducted from the card 
would be restored if the client chooses to cancel the transaction. Otherwise, 
the transaction would be resumed and money would be debited from the card 
permanently once the transaction is completed successfully. Consider different 
scenarios listed as follows: 
• Before the permanent deduction of money (before the execution of step 
18) 
In case of the abnormal terminal of the protocol, money that is tem-
porarily deducted in the card is restored. For the protocol termination 
before step 18, the gateway and seller server can ignore the uncommitted 
transaction since the gateway cannot send Token to the applet. More-
over, as the seller server cannot show the signed Token by the buyer to 
the gateway, the seller cannot earn any money. Even before step 18, the 
client host still cannot get Token to retrieve the product from the seller 
server since it is encrypted with the secret session key. In other words, 
the buyer will not pay for the product and the seller does not deliver the 
product to the buyer. 
• After the permanent deduction of money (after the execution of step 18) 
Up to step 18, it is guaranteed that the seller server has received Token 
from the gateway and the applet has received Token. Money is deducted 
permanently. For any subsequent termination of the protocol, the buyer 
can restore the broken transaction later and get the product from the 
seller. It should be noted that the execution of step 18 is atomic, i.e. 
step 18 is either executed successfully or uncommitted. 
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4.3 Conflict Resolution Policy 
In case there is a conflict among the seller, buyer and application service 
provider, the following conflict resolution policy can help to resolve the dispute. 
Several conflicts are considered: 
• Case 1: The buyer cannot deny a transaction if 
the gateway can show the request from the buyer and the seller can show 
the signed token from the buyer. 
• Case 2: The seller cannot deny a transaction if 
the gateway can show the acknowledgement from the seller and the buyer 
can show the acknowledgement from the seller in the signed token. 
• Case 3: The gateway cannot deny a transaction if 
the seller can show the acknowledgement from the gateway and the buyer 
can show the signed token from the gateway. 
4.4 Justifications 
Confidentiality 
It is trivial to show the confidentiality of the transaction protocol since the 
message transmitted in the protocol is secured with the triple DES key to keep 
the message from being read by other parties and signed by the appropriate 
RSA key. 
Non-repudiation 
By utilizing the digital signature and PKI, the transaction is non-repudiated. 
Messages must be signed by the corresponding party for making it effective. 
Therefore, any parties can resolve the conflict according to the conflict resolu-
tion policy described before. 
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Privacy and Anonymity 
To make the protocol practical in the real world, the transaction protocol 
supports partial-anonymity. During the transaction, the gateway does not 
send the identity of the buyer to the seller server. The seller would identify 
the buyer by the signed Token instead. On the other hand, only the buyer 
and the gateway knows all identities of the involved parties. 
4.5 Experimental Evaluation 
Several experiments are done to evaluate and analyze the performance of the 
transaction protocol so as to find the possible improvements. 
• Measurement of the transaction time on different hosts 
• Measurement of the on-card and the off-card computation time in the 
transaction 
• Testing of the recoverability of the transaction protocol 
4.5.1 Configuration 
The development environment is based on GemXpresso rapid application de-
velopment toolkit 211 version 2.4 with the GemXpresso 211PKis Java card. 
This Java card is implemented according to Java Card 2.1 API and Java Card 
2.1 VM [31] [11] with triple DES and RSA algorithms [57:. 
Different APIs are used for writing the test programs. They include Java 
Core API 1.2.2, Java Card 2.1, Java Cryptography Extension 1.2.1, Java Se-
cure Socket Extension 1.0.2，Opencard 1.2, Gemplus Card Service and Open 
Platform. 
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Figure 4.4: Transaction time with different hosts 
4.5.2 Performance Analysis 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment, the transaction times are tested on the hosts of different 
speeds. The average transaction time is around 3000 ms which is similar for 
both 500MHz and 667MHz PCs. The performance of the client host and server 
cannot affect the transaction protocol significantly. Therefore, we evaluate the 
on-card and off-card processing times in the experiment 2. 
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Server Host CPU (MHz) 500MHz 667MHz 
Server OS Windows 98 SE Windows 98 SE 
Client Host CPU (MHz) 500MHz 667MHz 
Client OS Windows 98 SE Windows 98 SE 
Average Time (ms) 3124 3082 
Standard Deviation 57 44 
Maximum Time (ms) 3240 3130 
Minimum Time (ms) 3020 3020 
Table 4.1: Statistical result of the transaction time with different hosts 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment, the on-card and off-card computation times are measured. 
The testing machine has 667MHz and 128M ram running on the windows 98 
SE platform. 
It is found that the on-card processing time is longer than the off-card 
processing time taking almost 70% of the total. However, the ratio of the 
on-card to the off-card processing time is less than that in the authentication. 
The extra-long off-card processing time is induced by the communication cost 
of the payment gateway with the seller server and application server. 
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On-card and off-card computation time in transaction 
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Figure 4.5: The On-card and the off-card computation time in the transaction 
On-card Off-card Total 
Average Time (ms) 2410 712 3122 
Standard Deviation 54 55 77 
Maximum Time (ms) 2530 820 3300 
Minimum Time (ms) 2360 660 3020 
Table 4.2: Statistical result of the on-card and the off-card computation time 
in the transaction 
Experiment 3 
Experiments are done to test the recoverability of the transaction protocol. We 
break the running transaction and resume the broken transaction. Considering 
the single point of failure in the protocol, we terminate the normal operations 
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of the card, host, gateway and seller server and evaluate the recoverability of 
the protocol. 
• Stop the card 
Any termination in steps 3, 5, 6 and 7 enables the silent termination 
of the transaction. The broken transaction can be resumed in the next 
login session. Otherwise, the card holder can cancel the transaction 
without affecting the other parties and the temporary deducted money 
can be restored. After the execution of step 18, it is guaranteed that the 
card holder can get the product even the subsequent termination of the 
protocol. The card holder can request the delivery of the product later. 
• Stop the host 
If the transaction is broken in steps 1 or 2, it will not affect other parties 
since the transaction is not submitted to the card. If the transaction is 
broken in step 8，the card can restore to the original state or resume the 
broken transaction in the next login session. If the transaction is broken 
in steps 16 or 17, the card can do the same as before. The application 
server and seller server do not suffer from any loss for the storage of an 
invalid record. The card holder can execute steps 20 and 21 until the 
product is retrieved from the seller server. 
• Stop the payment gateway 
If the transaction is broken in steps 9，10 or 11, the host and card can 
restore the transaction later; the seller server operates normally as the 
broken transaction record is not received. For the termination in steps 
14 or 15, the host and card can restore the broken transaction as before. 
Alternatively, it is not harmful to the seller server since the card cannot 
obtain the Token for the retrieval of the product. 
• Stop the seller server 
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Considering the broken transaction in steps 12 or 13, the payment gate-
way can detect this condition by using the acknowledgement from the 
seller server. The gateway can send the REJECT signal to the host and 
card to recover from this broken transaction. If the transaction is broken 
in step 22, the seller server can use the sophisticated product delivery 
protocol to provide a reliable product delivery. The buyer can execute 
steps 18 and 19 until he receives the desired product. 
To conclude, the abnormal termination of the transaction can always be 
recovered successfully, and the payment can always flow correctly. 
Chapter 5 
E-Commerce Builder 
Nowadays, smart cards are regarded as the promising enabler of the E-commerce 
system. Smart card systems have a stronger resistant to reverse engineering 
compared with the mandatory approach that the business logic resides in the 
client host. Nonetheless, the development of smart card based e-commerce sys-
tems is heavily dependent on the knowledge of smart card operating systems, 
security and different advanced application-programming interfaces. Under-
standing the smart card operating systems [32], namely file system smart card, 
Java Card, Multos and smart card for windows, is not enough for an appli-
cation developer to develop a smart card based system. It is also essential to 
understand the OpenCard architecture [31] [41] [47] to interface with the smart 
card and card terminal. To familiarize oneself with the cryptographic theory 
"53] [61] [14] [13] and security-related application programming interfaces [39 
50] [69] is also a formidable task. Altogether, the acquisition of this knowledge 
definitely lengthens the development period and significantly raises the cost of 
the development. Otherwise, a fragile system may be built without carefully 
understanding them. 
This chapter proposes the first innovative solution for the rapid application 
development (RAD) of smart-card based B2C k P2P E-commerce applica-
tions. We have developed a builder with all the necessary resources for these 
types of application developments. With our builder, it helps to speed up the 
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development time effectively. Our builder supports strong authentication ser-
vices and reliable transaction services with service recovery. The flexibility of 
our builder also facilities the application developer to customize their appli-
cations according to their requirements. Section 5.1 gives an overview of the 
builder. The underlying mechanism and the detailed implementation of the 
builder are described in sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. A comparison with 
other similar products is outlined in section 5.4 and an example of the usage 
is shown in section 5.5. 
5.1 Overview 
Smart RAD has a number of important features, which are radical to the 
ordinary B2C and P2P e-commerce applications: 
• Strong Authentication Service 
• Reliable Transaction Service 
• High Customization Capability 
• Accountability 
• Standardized Public Key Infrastructure 
Strong Authentication Service 
Unlike most of the e-commerce applications, the authentication service is based 
on what the card holder has and what the card holder knows. Nowadays, sim-
ple password based authentication systems cannot cope with the stringent se-
curity requirement of many e-commerce systems. Our authentication protocol 
72] is intended to ensure the confidentiality, non-repudiation, anonymity and 
authentication of the services provided. Different from other smart card based 
authentication services [7] [9] [35] [38], it can perform mutual authentication, 
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and handle the failure of smart cards or the authentication server properly as 
mentioned in chapter 3. 
Reliable Transaction Service 
Transactions occur frequently between the application service provider and all 
card holders. Hence, we offer the transaction service that enables the developer 
to deploy, and the non-repudiated transaction protocol such that the conflict 
between the application service provider and card holder can be resolved easily. 
The details of the transaction mechanism can be found in chapter 4. 
High Code-level Customization Capability 
Considering that different application service providers have different applica-
tion logics, we allow the developer to embed their own application logic within 
our system framework. The developer is able to build their services based on 
the authentication service, and therefore, controls the interaction between the 
card and application server. 
Security 
With a view to providing a fast and secure communication channel between the 
application provider and card holder, the communication channel is protected 
with a triple DES [31] session key for each new login session. Triple DES 
with 112-bit key length means a very high level of security. It has stronger 
resistance to the linear and differential cryptanalysis [59] than DES . 
Accountability 
All the transaction and interactions with a bank are recorded and kept for 
audit trace. The application service provider and card holder can keep their 
own logs and use it for any possible conflict resolutions. 
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Standardized Public Key Infrastructure 
The system is built on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The certificate is 
created and signed with accordance to the X.509 standard. With this feature, 
the system can inter-operate with other PKI systems. 
The card holder can take advantage of the RSA key [57] in the smart card 
to sign the sensitive data and use the triple DES session key for encryption and 
decryption. On the other hand, other card holders can retrieve the certificate 
of a particular user with the help of the certification authority and therefore, 
verify a signed message. 
When a smart card is issued to a card holder, a pair of RSA keys is gener-
ated on the card. The private key is stored in the card while the public key is 
downloaded from the card and bound to a X.509 certificate, which would be 
stored in the certification authority. 
5.2 Design of Smart RAD 
With a view to offering a comprehensive solution for B2B k P2P e-commerce 
software development, the design of the builder is based on the principle that 
it can provide sophisticated e-commerce operations reliably and be customized 
easily by the developer. Also, the builder architecture should be extended and 
enhanced easily. 
5.2.1 Mechanism 
Figure 5.1 shows the system architecture of Smart RAD. It provides an inter-
face for the developer to access the services provided by the Host layer and 
Java Card layer. Some utilities are offered to allow the developer to access 
and maintain all servers. In our case, the servers are the authentication server, 
certification authority and time server. The developers should also define their 
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database schema and build their own application server based on the authenti-
cation server. For the interests of brevity, some UML [28] diagrams are drawn 
as circles or the object attributes are not shown. The Smart RAD applica-
tion builder is a software development toolbox containing the following three 
packages corresponding to the Java Card, Host and Server layers respectively. 
• Package cuhk. cse. demo, applet in Java Card Layer 
• Package cuhk. cse. demo, client in Host Layer 
• Package server in Server Layer 
The above three packages are detailed below. 
5.2.2 Java Card Layer 
Figure 5.2 shows the UML diagram of the objects in the Java Card layer. UML 
is the universal modelling language, which is used to describe the class formally 
with a diagram, and show the relationship with other classes. The objects in 
the Java Card layer manages the logic and information in the card. Package 
cuhk. cse. demo, applet is made up of a number of classes. The purposes of each 
class are listed as follows. 
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• UFOApplet 
It is the central unit of the card. It initializes and manages all the 
information. It is also responsible for the communication between the 
card and card terminal. 
• HashGenerator 
It is used to generate a pair of hash function during the initialization of 
the card for the service subscriber. The generated hash functions f and 
F are used for the authentication. 
• Hash 
It is the logical representation of the mathematical hash function / . It 
is used for the authentication. 
• SmartPurse 
It is the on-card agent for the management of credit records. It can 
insert, delete and update records. 
• Record 
It is the logical representation of a bank credit record. 
參 TransactionManager 
It is the on-card agent for the management of all the transaction-related 
operations such as insertion, deletion and updates of transaction records. 
The agent can keep the information for any conflict resolutions. 
• Transaction 
It is the logical representation of a transaction record. It would store 
the attributes of the transaction such as the status of emptiness and 
completeness. 
Chapter 5 E-Commerce Builder 71 
o , o o 
Hash java card .framework. Applet HashGenerator < 
UfOAppiet 
o^ o ^ 
Record SmartPurse ^ Transaction rransacffonManager 
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5.2.3 Host Layer 
Figure 5.3 shows the UML diagram of the objects in the Host layer. The Host 
layer forms an interface between the developer and card. The developer can 
retrieve, update, add or clear the information on the card via this layer. Here, 
we outline the function of each class in this layer. These classes correspond to 
the classes in the package cuhk.cse. demo, client The function of each class in 
this layer is outlined as follows. • ClientBase 
It provides the basic facility to access the card applet. 
• Install 
It uploads the packages onto the card and initializes the card applet. It 
updates the information in the user database and certification authority. 
• BigHash 
It is the logical representation of the mathematical hash function F. It 
is used for the authentication. 
• CustomCardAndKeyGen 
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It is the utility class providing the facility to create and sign a certificate 
for a specified user by a specified issuer. 
• CardUtility 
It is the utility class that provides an interface for the developer to access 
the function of the card. The developer must use it to perform the 
functions such as the generation of the hash function and a pair of RSA 
key, as well as the query of transactions and banking records. 
• CAUtility 
It is the utility class that allows the developer to retrieve the certificate 
in the certification authority server. 
• TimeUtility 
It is the utility class that allows the developer to access the time server 
to retrieve the current GMT time. 
• Transaction 
It is the logical representation of the transaction record. 
• BankRecord 
It is the logical representation of the bank credit record. 
5.2.4 Server Layer 
Figure 5.4 shows the UML diagram of the objects in the utility package. In 
general, the utility package provides the services related to the certification 
authority, authentication server (application server) and time server. 
• Certification Authority Server 
The certification authority has the certification repository that can add, 
update and distribute the certificates it stored. 
Chapter 5 E-Commerce Builder 73 
o o o o 
CUentBase BatikRecord CAUMty Serializable 
/ K BioHash 
\ o 
/ ^ j Serializable 
^^ Transaction 
tnstaff CardUmy , 
o o 
CustomCertAndKeyGen Timeiftiiity 
Figure 5.3: UML diagram of the objects in Host layer 
• Time Server 
The time server can distribute its GMT time. 
• Authentication Server 
The authentication server can perform the remote authentication proto-
col with remote clients and establish a secret triple DES key for subse-
quent communications with the top-level application layer in the client 
side. 
5.3 Implementation 
We describe the implementation details of the builder from the development 
tools to implementation issues. The proposed implementation is cross-platform. 
5.3.1 Implementation Reflection 
The following softwares/hardwares are deployed for building the builder: 
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Figure 5.4: Utility Services 
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1. GemXpresso RAD 211 version 2.4 
It is the development builder [21] for building an application on Gemplus 
smart cards. It provides the Gemplus-specific application-programming 
interface [23] [25] [24 . 
2. Java Development Kit 1.2.2 
It provides the necessary Java Virtual Machine and Application Pro-
gramming Interface [65] for building Java applications. 
3. Java Secure Socket Extension 1.0.2 
It is a Java package [68] that enables secure Internet communications. 
It implements a Java version of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [46] and 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols and includes functionality for 
data encryption, server authentication, message integrity, and optional 
client authentication. 
4. Java Cryptography Extension 1.2.1 
It is an application-programming interface [67] that provides a framework 
and implementations for encryption, key generation and key agreement, 
and Message Authentication Code (MAC). Encryptions including sym-
metric, asymmetric, block and stream ciphers are also supported. 
5. OpenCard Framework 
It is an application programming interface for bridging the communica-
tion between the card reader and card terminal. 
6. GCR 410 Smart Card Reader 
It is an external reader for serial port. The reader supports ISO 7816-
1 /2 /3 /4 memory/microprocessor card and accepts T=0 and T=1 proto-
cols. 
7. GemXpresso PKis smart card 
It has a RSA crypto-processor and support triple DES algorithm. 
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5.3.2 Implementation Issues 
In the implementation of the builder, the following problems are encountered 
and we describe how we resolve them. 
1. Limitation of Java Card VM 
Due to the memory constraint of the ordinary smart card, the Java Card 
VM only supports a subset of features of Java languages. Therefore, 
numbers of double, float, or long type cannot be manipulated. 
2. Limitation of the cryptographic processor of the smart card 
Smart cards cannot support all cryptographic algorithms. GemXpresso 
211PKis card supports both triple DES and RSA. That means only one 
secret key algorithm and one public key algorithm can be used. The 
principle is to use the public key algorithm to establish a secret session 
key because the cost for using the public key algorithm is higher in 
general. It would be cost-effective and secure to adopt a hybrid approach. 
3. Memory constraint of the smart card 
The smart card always suffers from two kinds of memory-related prob-
lems. Lack of memory confines the functionality of smart card appli-
cation and memory leakage can lead to fault in runtime. In our case, 
GemXpresso 211PKis card offers 32 K of ROM, 32 K of EEPROM and 2 
K of ROM. Out of these resources, about 23 K of EEPROM and 0.8 K of 
RAM are available to application developers. Hence, we are particularly 
careful to instantiate an object. Reuse the object as much as possible 
and confine to the singleton pattern [36] if the object to be instantiated 
is large or resource-intensive. 
4. I /O speed and bandwidth of the card terminal 
The cost of the latency for communications between the card and card 
terminal should be considered. Most of the smart card readers use the 
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serial port as the terminal connection with the client host. Also, there is 
a constraint on the maximum size of the data to be transferred between 
them. 
5. Type conversion between the card and card terminal 
As the underlying transmission protocol between the card and card ter-
minal only supports the transfer of byte stream, the object to be trans-
ferred between them should be converted to byte array. Hence, for these 
objects, they should have the constructor with the byte array as the input 
argument and the method toByteArrayi) to generate the corresponding 
byte array. 
6. Implementation of PKI with open standard API 
In order to build a generic PKI, we should not use the third party API for 
building the PKI. This introduces one difficulty since JDK cannot gen-
erate a certificate without using keytool Even the package sun. security 
can only be used to issue a self-signed certificate. We therefore imple-
ment our own class for issuing self-signed certificates and issuer-specific 
certificates in accordance to X.509 standard [33 . 
7. Performance of the implementation 
Since the implementation of this builder is based on the Java language. 
We should be particularly careful when dealing with I /O, graphical user 
interface control [71] and threading [39 . 
5.4 Evaluation 
In this section, we compare our integrated solution with other smart card 
products. The products being compared with include CyberFlex Access [55], 
GemMobile Card Issuer [18], Gemplus Wallet [19] , and GemUtilities [20 . 
Table 5.1 describes these products briefly and table 5.2 shows the comparison 
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of the builder with different similar products according to their functionalities 
and features. Analysis and experimental results of the authentication and the 
transaction protocols have been described in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
Products Description  
CyberFlex Access Cross platform development kit for multi-function cryptographic cards 
Gemplus Wallet Development kit for Smart card-based electronic wallet 
GemUtilities E-commerce software toolkit to automate repetitive tasks so customers can 
easily and quickly navigate and make purchases on the Internet 
GemMobile Card Issuer Personalization software tool enabling quick personalization of SIM cards in 
a secure environment  
Table 5.1: Brief description of smart card development products 
Products Smart R A D CyberFlex Access Gemplus Wallet GemUtilities GemMobile Card Issuer 
Local Authentication Yes No Yes Yes No 
Remote Authentication Yes No Yes No No 
Reliable Transaction Yes No Yes No No 
Personalization Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Accountability Yes No Yes No No 
Code-level Customization Yes, Yes No No No  
PKI Support Yes ^ ^ No ^  
Table 5.2: Comparison of Smart RAD with other products 
As shown in the table, most of the smart card products are only designed 
for local access, which is not suitable for the ordinary e-commerce applications. 
The e-commerce application always involves the remote access service. On the 
other hand, Smart RAD provides both local and remote authentications such 
that the system can be applied either locally or remotely. 
As a matter of fact, products like Gemplus Wallet and GemMobile Card 
Issuer are limited to apply to the transaction related in-house application de-
velopments. Their features of personalization are also very restricted and 
definitely not appropriate for more sophisticated software development. By 
providing code-level customization, the application developer is able to build 
smart card based applications according to their requirements. 
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Unlike other products, our system can inter-operate with other secure ser-
vices through the common public key infrastructure. 
5.5 An Application Example: Multi-MAX 
After understanding the internal structure of Smart RAD, we show how to 
deploy this builder in the design and implementation phase of P2P and B2C 
e-commerce application development. We illustrate it with Multi-MAX. The 
builder is used in the the development of the transaction and authentication 
modules of Multi-MAX. Multi-MAX is a large-scale online trading platform 
that is a P2P and B2C application. It allows the service subscriber to buy 
and sell product with other service subscribers. At the same time, the server 
subscriber can use the same interface to shop on web-based retail portals. 
5.5.1 System Model 
Figure 5.5 describes the system model of Multi-MAX. The seller and buyer 
are the service subscribers. The seller can sell an electronic product or a 
physical product by publishing the product list in the directory repository. 
The potential buyer can browse the item listed in the directory repository. 
Whenever a buyer locates a desired item for purchase, the buyer can negotiate 
with the seller in real time through audio/video conferences. Alternatively, 
retail portals can publish their products on the web and the buyer can also 
buy it. 
Once the seller and buyer have made the deal, the payment is made from 
the buyer's smart card and deposited on the application server which is built 
on top of the authentication server. The seller can retrieve the payment later 
with his smart card or through a specific bank account. The service subscriber 
can use the same graphical user interface to access the trading services through 
a browser or a stand-alone application. 
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Figure 5.5: System Model of Multi-MAX 
5.5.2 Design Issues 
To deploy Smart RAD builder for building Multi-MAX, several issues need to 
be considered in the design phase. 
• What kind of customized service would be built on top of the authenti-
cation server. For example, the developer can provide the services such 
as auction, gambling or trading. 
• What information is needed during the initialization of the card for the 
service subscriber. In addition, the developer can perform other tailored 
initialization other than the initialization of the smart card. 
• What utility servers need to be integrated with the system such as the 
time server, certification authority server or other developer's servers. 
5.5.3 Implementation Issues 
For the purpose of deploying the builder in the implementation of Multi-MAX, 
we demonstrate the procedures for implementing the system with four steps. 
1. Extend class cuhk. cse. demo. client.Install and override method initCard() 










Figure 5.6: UML diagram of class Install 
to perform the customized initialization. Figure 5.6 shows its UML dia-
gram. The developer can perform the proper initialization with the card 
and user database. 
2. Extend class server.RunTradeServerThread and override method cus-
tomized(). The secret triple DES session key, input and output streams 
will be passed to the method as arguments. The developer can use the 
stream to communicate with the client while the triple DES session key, 
which is established during authentication can be used for encryption 
and decryption of messages sent between the client and server. Figure 
5.7 shows the UML diagrams of class RunTradeServer and RunTrade-
ServerThread. Finally, the registry of RunTradeServer Thread in Run-
TradeServer should be updated with the classes that are extended from 
them. 
3. Extend class cuhk. cse. demo, client CardUtility and then the developer 
can add his customized methods that are corresponding to the devel-
oper's customized application server. With this, the developer can con-
trol the logic and information in the card. Figure 5.8 illustrates the UML 
diagram of the class CardUtility. 
4. Extend the classes server.RunTimeServerThread and server.RunCAServerThread, 
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Figure 5.7: UML diagram of class RunTradeServer and RunTradeServer-
Thread 
and overrides methods getCert() and getTimeQ respectively if neces-
sary so as to integrate the system with the developer's certification au-
thority server and time server. Figure 5.9 shows the UML diagram of 
these classes. The registry of classes RunTimeServerThread and Run-
CAServerThread in RunTimeS erver and RunCAServer should be up-
dated with the classes that are extended from them. 
With the use of the Java Network Launching Protocol (JNLP) [56], the 
application can run alone or in a browser. Namely, it is promising that the 
service subscriber can access the services with the same interface in different 
environments. Figure 5.10 shows a sample JNLP file. To gain the advantage of 
JNLP, the web server should be JNLP enabled and the desktop of the service 
subscriber has to be installed with the Java Web Start client program [70 
which is able to handle the JNLP request. 
With Java Web Start, the subscriber can launch the application by simply 
clicking on a web page link. If the application is installed for the first time, 
it would be cached on the user computer. The subscriber can invoke the 
cached application from the desktop or browser. It should be noted that the 
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Java Web Start application is independent from the implementations of the 
browsers. It provides the flexible application version management and security 
management. 
<?xml versions" 1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> 




<homepage href = "http//www.cse.cuhk.eciu.hk"/> 
<description>Multi-MAX Demo</description� 
�description kind=" short" >Mutli-MAX Pro j ect < /description> 
� i c o n href="logo.jpg"/> 




� / s e c u r i t y � 
<application-desc main-class二"client丄ogonFrame"> 
<argument>Product Code< /argument> 
<argument>Merchant Code< /argument> 
�argument�Price< /argument> 
<argument>Product Description< /argument> 
< argument > Time < / argument > 
< / application-desc> 
</jnlp> 
Figure 5.10: Sample JNLP file 
5.5.4 Evaluation 
We have tested the trading platform, Multi-MAX and evaluated its perfor-
mance during the initialization, authentication and transaction. 
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Figure 5.11: Snapshot of initialization form 
Initialization 
A snapshot of the initialization to the card and server is shown in figure 5.11. 
During the initialization, the information of the service subscriber would be 
loaded onto the card. Concurrently, an X.509 certificate can be created and a 
signed request can be submitted to the certification authority. The certificate 
of subscriber can be signed and stored in the certification authority while the 
private key can be stored safely in the card. 
Figure 5.12 shows the shopping portal, in which the user can select the 
desired item for shopping. Using Java Web Start, Multi-MAX can integrate 
with the browser to offer the same graphical user interface to the user. 
Authentication 
Figure 5.13 shows the authentication screen. By supplying a valid username 
and the password, the service subscriber can activate the PIN-protected smart 
card after the authentication protocol has performed a local and remote au-
thentication with the remote application server successfully. Afterwards, the 
service subscriber can access the services provided by the application server. 
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Figure 5.14: Snapshot of banking form 
For example, the card can be deposited with more money on the banking 
form. The payment can be charged either from the credit card account or 
banking account. Logs which stores the last five deposit records are shown in 
the same form as shown in figure 5.14. 
Transaction 
Figure 5.15 shows the snapshot of Multi-MAX on how it handles transaction 
related operations. A list of transactions is displayed in the item table. By se-
lecting the desired item from the item table, the service subscriber is prompted 
for the confirmation before the purchase of the selected item(s). Only after 
successful transaction, the payment would be deducted from the card and the 
corresponding log would be recorded in the card. The log can be used for audit 
checks or dispute resolution. Figure 5.16 shows the log of all transactions. 
The resulting system can be built rapidly with Smart RAD. The remote 
Chapter 5 E-Commerce Builder 88 
r 、 〜 今 � � ‘ � ” 
S�� , , ‘ 
•、'：作‘«• V：； ；、 I ' • : “ � � “ ？ ： 二 1 � ’ 
-、 ‘ ‘ ‘ ……八… 
：：广 - ‘ • 
. * 二 
s i ^ ^ S - _ • • • _ / - � ’ " - - H - S 
“ r ‘ 
p “ � • 
j r _ … „ 
I 奢 、 5. ‘ 
i: I 1 ；！； ii 
• ••; g ...,；|,.,.小.,‘.....,.‘.,？,.-,.-.,.：_.,•--.‘.州少w.州 . ‘ 
r ‘ .. 
I f 麵 
S r � … ’ ： 
； r , „ 
！ I I I 
-j r ； - -- £ 
I r ‘ I 严 - . ；- '''-''、-' ‘ ‘“‘ 鞾 
I ？ •  -‘ ‘ atftt^t 
I . _. _|___|幽|____|__|_____ .. 1 
j �•‘ A"’ ‘ “�A乾 
Figure 5.15: Snapshot of transaction form 
Muiti-MAXTradtng System 
•一 —- — — …一一—I 
；[| My Profile ^  rVadeLog^  j s Bank Vf ^ Qun 
i Tr^ eHistorv__  
Delete] Dale j Seller | Filename | Price File Descrption Group 
i | �i r ! i'""" """" ml Ii: 
：! I -------- ———™—…™j - I  
：！ ……一——I— 一…— T""""'"""" •"' ‘ ‘“ I ；：欲I� 1：；： ； r „ „ „ t —— i ^ j-I ———— t- ， 丄 
：； ？二 4. !• {：：|-：：：->!. !：： P ！ ！ ！ ！ 111 i! 
：I '..--�.••一 i „ | „ If— — — 奴”了 i；；. 
n ‘ "p" i I i 11 w 
ij i » 
i i 一一!_ .„ i- "4 — — ""t 1:«、:，:i i-： 
L X L j 二 i �� 
l - f - 1 ！ N 
jr_j 1 ！ ： i 
； r : I i  
i ~ I ！ : � ‘ 
丨"TZIZT""" ‘ i ！ I - ： 
i " F ^  
； ： I �I iiiir I I i 、丨 
I 厂 i ‘ ； 、： i 
i I E T Z Z Z l ^ i J I i 
i I z z y ! 
*« i > I 1 i；： 
DELETE DELETE ALL , 
:i| ‘ J 11; 
„ _ — " T — — ——" — “―"“― “….'.".：-::,"^  " " "T^. . 
Figure 5.16: Snapshot of transaction log form 
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authentication and transaction services can be integrated to perform the online 
trading process. The performance of the authentication and transaction are 
efficiency enough to work properly. The remote authentication services can 
recognize the correct card holder correctly and the transaction is performed 
with recover abilities. 
As mentioned before, Smart RAD provides the public key infrastructure 
so that Multi-Max can be compatible with other PKIs. In other words, the 
certificate can be recognized by other parties and it is trivial to interact with 
other systems using the same trading protocol. 
5.6 Future Work 
With the thriving development of e-commerce, different applications of smart 
cards can be built either vertically or horizontally. In view of coping with these 
tremendous changes, the following features can be added to Smart RAD in the 
future. 
• Develop a more generic interface for the transaction records in the card 
applet: Different e-commerce projects may have their own transaction 
interface and need different customizations. Different option attributes, 
which are used by the developer can be added. 
• Develop the copyright agent: It acts as a security manager to ensure the 
usage of a product compliant with the license agreement, or the behavior 
of the service subscriber is compliant with the permission context, which 
defines the access rights of the subscriber. 
• Allow the card applet to be automatically customized by the developer 
and therefore the developer can add their own Java Card classes to the 
card. It involves auto code generation. 
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• Integrate with the personal email system: The service subscribers can use 
the same smart card to protect their emails from being read or sent by 




The objective of this thesis is to describe the unique and efficient smart card 
based secure services for e-commerce. We have particularly tackled the ap-
proach of using smart cards incorporated with the public key infrastructure. 
We have designed the unique remote authentication protocol, which improves 
significantly on the existing protocols. 
To perform the remote authentication, the approach of using one-way hash 
functions f and F has been described. To ensure the authentication protocol 
from being suffered from replay attacks, a number of nonce have been used to 
ensure the freshness of messages. Experimental results have indicated that its 
implementation on the Java Card is feasible and its performance is good in 
speed. A formal notation BAN logic has been deployed for the analysis of the 
correctness of the protocol. On the other hand, we have identified different 
problems in existing authentication protocols and shown how to correct them 
with our protocol. 
Based on the proposed authentication protocol, an efficient and secure 
transaction protocol has been built. It supports the transaction recovery and 
handles micro-payments. The transaction is performed atomically such that 
either credit and debit operations have to be completed, or the original state 
has to be restored. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
It should be noted that the remote authentication is of paramount impor-
tant to the e-commerce application with remote service access. With the highly 
integration of transaction and authentication protocols, the security of the e-
commerce application is less susceptible to be intruded than the mandatory 
approach that the security measure of the transaction protocol is separated 
from the authentication protocol. 
Towards a better utilization of smart cards in the e-commerce, we have de-
signed and developed a generic builder, Smart RAD, which is an application-
programming toolbox for application developers to build secure smart card 
based applications. The developer can develop secure e-commerce systems 
rapidly without knowing the sophisticated architecture of smart cards. We 
have developed a web-based B2C and application-based P2P trading plat-
forms called Multi-Max for evaluation purpose. This trading platform has 
demonstrated the feasibility and flexibility of our toolbox developed. 
Appendix A 
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Detail Experimental Result 
A. l Authentication Time Measurement 
C P U 333MHz 500MHz 667MHz 
Memory 224M 128M 128M 
Authentication Time (ms) Authentication Time (ms) Authentication Time (ms) 
3620 3300 
3790 3570 3350 
3680 3300 3180 
3730 3290 3250 
3850 3630 3240 
3840 3290 3240 
3840 3250 3130 
3680 3290 3180 
3680 3400 3190 
3620 3460 3240 
3680 3300 3630 
3850 3290 3240 
3680 3570 3130 
3510 3350 3240 
3630 3190 3240 
3840 3300 3290 
3740 3290 3140 
3620 3410 3300 
3520 3190 3300 
3730 3180 3350 
3520 3180 3130 
3840 3620 3190 
3680 3570 3290 
3630 3350 3300 
3570 3410 3130 
3900 3680 3130 
3680 3400 3240 
3620 3360 3190 
3570 3350 3190 
3520 3400 3180 
3840 3290 3300 
3680 3300 3300 
3630 3300 3130 
3570 3350 3190 
3900 3180 3190 
3680 3290 3190 
3620 3250 3130 
3570 3350 3180 
3520 3290 3190 
~ A v e r a g e Time ( m s ) “ 3700 3361 3229 
Standard Deviation 123 136 93 
Maximum Time (ms) 3960 3680 3630 
Minimum Time (ms) | ^ ^  
Table A.l : Authentication Time Measurement 
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A.2 On-Card and Off-Card Computation Time 
in Authentication 
The client host and the server have 667MHz and 128M ram running on windows 
98 SE. 
On-card (ms) Off-card (ms) Total (ms) 
2690 610 3300 
2750 490 3240 
2630 500 3130 
2690 550 3240 
2690 550 3240 
2590 650 3240 
2630 720 3350 
2690 500 3190 
2690 490 3180 
2700 600 3300 
2690 610 3300 
2700 600 3300 
2630 550 3180 
2700 490 3190 
2690 600 3290 
2690 610 3300 
2630 500 3130 
2630 500 3130 
2740 610 3350 
2690 440 3130 
2640 600 3240 
2680 560 3240 
2690 500 3190 
2690 440 3130 
2700 600 3300 
2750 540 3290 
2640 490 3130 
2640 600 3240 
2690 610 3300 
2690 550 3240 
2640 490 3130 
Average Time (ms) 2677 558 3235 
Standard Deviation 38 67 69 
Maximum Time (ms) 2750 720 3350 
Minimum Time (ms) 2590 440 3130 
Table A.2: On-card and off-card computation time in authentication 
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A.3 Authentication Time with Different Servers 
The testing client host has 500MHz CPU and 128M ram running on windows 
98 SE platform. 
Server C P U ^ ^ ^ 270MHz 華 MHz 
Server Memory 224M 512M 8G 
Server OS Windows 98 SE Solaris 2.6 Solaris 7 
Authentication Time (ms) Authentication Time (ms) Authentication Time (ms)  
^ 3300 
3570 3840 3350 
3300 3740 3350 
3290 3900 3300 
3630 3790 3400 
3290 3840 3350 
3250 3850 3410 
3290 3900 3350 
3400 3730 3290 
3460 3850 3350 
3300 3730 3240 
3290 3790 3300 
3570 3740 3410 
3350 3680 3290 
3190 3840 3300 
3300 3680 3400 
3290 3680 3300 
3410 3730 3290 
3190 3740 3300 
3180 3850 3300 
3180 3730 3520 
3620 3900 3350 
3570 3730 3240 
3350 3850 3290 
3410 3790 3410 
3680 3850 3350 
3400 3790 3410 
3360 3840 3240 
3350 3790 3290 
3400 3740 3460 
3290 3840 3240 
3300 3790 3300 
3300 3790 3290 
3350 3790 3300 
3180 3740 3350 
3290 3790 3460 
3250 3790 3300 
3350 3840 3350 
^ ^ ^  
Average Time (ms) ^ 3791 3335 
Standard Deviation 136 61 65 
Maximum Time (ms) 3680 3900 3520 
Minimum Time (ms) ^ ^ — 
Table A.3: Authentication time measurement with different servers 
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A.4 Transaction Time Measurement 
Server C P U 500MHz; 667MHz 
Server Memory 128M 128M 
Client C P U 500MHz 667MHz 
Client Memory 128M 128M 
Transaction Time (ms) Transaction Time (ms) 




























3130 3 0 ^ 
Average Time ( m s ) ~ 3124 3082 
Standard Deviation 57 44 
Maximum Time (ms) 3240 3130 
Minimum Time (ms) ^ ^ I 
Table A.4: Transaction time measurement 
A.5 On-card and Off-card Computation Time 
in Transaction 
The client host and the server has 667MHz and 128M ram running on windows 
98 SE platform. 
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On-card (ms) Off-card (ms) Total (ms) 
2 4 ^ 820 3300 
2470 660 3130 
2410 770 3180 
2530 660 3190 
2470 720 3190 
2470 660 3130 
2420 770 3190 
2410 780 3190 
2420 710 3130 
2360 710 3070 
2360 660 3020 
2360 770 3130 
2360 720 3080 
2420 660 3080 
2360 660 3020 
2360 660 3020 
2360 770 3130 
2360 660 3020 
Average Time (ms) 2410 712 3122 
Standard Deviation 54 55 77 
Maximum Time (ms) 2530 820 3300 
Minimum Time (ms) 2360 660 3020 
Table A.5: On-card and off-card computation time in transaction 
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UML Diagram 
B• 1 Package cuhk.cse.demo• applet 
UFOApplet 




+InstalKbA rray:b}/te[L t>Qffset: byte, bLength:byte) :void 
+seiectO:boolean 
+deseiectO:void 
+buifdKey(fNA .short, t:shoit_ tshort hash-.Hash) :void 
+encrypt(buffer:byte[l inOffsetshon, iengthshort, output: byteH :void 
+decn/pt(biifrerbyteg inOffsetahon, _th:shorl output: bytell outOfTsetshon) .void 
+paddedData(buf:b}/te[l inOffsetshort, fength:short,pdd:bytell} :st)on 
+amer}ticate(apdu:A PDU) void 
+process(apdu:A PUD) .void 
Figure B.l: UML diagram of UFOApplet 
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+getN(butfer:byte[l offsetshort, iength:sho}f .short < 
Figure B.3: UML diagram of HashGenerator 









Figure B.4: UML diagram of Record 















+iipdateO:void ^  
+fir}dHe_ 血 n " 
Figure B.5: UML diagram of SmartPurse 












Figure B.6: UML diagram of Transaction 





+get丨 nstanceO TransactionManager 
+getRecordOndex:byte) Transaction 








Figure B.7: UML diagram of TransactionManager 
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+Client 曰 aseO 
+addCTUster}er(handferCTUstener) :void 
+removeCrUstener(handier:CTUstener}:void 




+printA vaifabieTerminafQ :void 
Figure B.8: UML diagram of ClientBase 








+authenticate(pin:b]/te[l nameStrin^ :int 
+QetUsemameO :St_ 
+getBafanceO:int 













+dearTransaction(index:byte) -.boolean __ 
+dearTransactionOndexibytelD -.booiean ^ 
+clearTransactionQ -.boolean 
Figure B.9: UML diagram of CardUtility 
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Install 



















Figure B.ll : UML diagram of BankRecord 

























Figure B.13: UML diagram of BigHash 
























Figure B.16: UML diagram of CustomCertAndKeyGen 
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B.3 Package server 
TradePanel 




















+actionPertomed(9:A ctionEven^ -.void 
Figure B.18: UML diagram of CAPanel 



















+actionPerformec{(e:A ctionEven^ yoid 
+addGB(aComp:CornponenlxMyM 'void 
+addDBinPanei(aPanef:JPanei, aComp:Component aConsl.GndBagConstraints^xMyM .void 
+main(args:Stmg[!} :void 
Figure B.20: UML diagram of ServerFrame 





















Figure B.23: UML diagram of RunTimeServer 
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RunTimeServerThread 










+Ru nTra deServer(obje ct: Object.po rt: i nt.textAre a JTextAre a) 
+r_:void 
Figure B.25: UML diagram of RunTradeServer 
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RunTradeServerThread 
Runnable 
Run TradeServerThread  













Figure B.27: UML diagram of StopServer 
Appendix C 
Glossary and Abbreviation 
• 3DES - Triple Data Encryption Standard 
• APDU - Application Protocol Data Unit 
• B2C - Business to Customer, a service that allows the customer to pur-
chase a product from the Internet 
• BAN logic - Logic for analyzing the correctness of authentication protocol 
• Card Applet - A Java program that runs and executes on Java Card 
• Command APDU - the APDU sent to the card 
• DES - Data Encryption Standard 
• Digital Signature - the fingerprint of a message for integrity and authen-
ticity 
• EDE - Encrypt-decrypt-encrypt, a sequence of 3DES encryption 
• EEE - Encrypt-encrypt-encrypt, a sequence of 3DES encryption 
• EEPROM - Electrically Erasable Programmable Memory. 
• Hash - a function to generate a fingerprint for input data 
• Java Card - A smart card that can run Java program 
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• JCE - Java Cryptography Extension 
• JDK - Java Development Toolkit 
• JSSE - Java Secure Socket Extension 
• JVM - Java Virtual Machine 
• Local Authentication - authentication for local access 
• OpenCard - Standard for smart card access on Java platform 
• P2P - Peer-to-Peer 
• PKI - Public Key Infrastructure 
• Private Key - It is used for the generation of signature and decryption 
• Public Key - It is used for the verification of signature and encryption 
• Public Key Algorithm - Asymmetric key algorithm where public key is 
accessible by any parties, while the private key is kept by the own as a 
secret. 
• Remote Authentication - authentication for remote access 
• Response APDU - APDU sent from the card 
• ROM - Read Only Memory 
• RSA - Asymmetric cryptographic algorithm found by Rivest, Shamir and 
Adlemen 
• Secret Key - The key for symmetric algorithm 
• Smart Card - A credit card sized plastic card with processor chip 
• Tamper-proof - A device is tamper-proof if the information in that device 
would be lost when someone tries to tamper with the device 
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• UML - Universal Modelling Language 
4 
Bibliography 
1] w . A. Aiello, A. D. Rubin, and M. J . Strauss. Using smartcards to secure 
a personalized gambling device. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference 
on Computer and communications security, pages 128-137, 1999. 
2] N. Asokan, P. A. Janson, and M. Waidner. The state of the art in elec-
tronic payment systems. In Computer, volume 30, pages 28-35, September 
1997. 
3] N. Asokan, M. Schunter, and M. Waidner. Optimistic protocols for fair 
exchange. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and 
communications security, pages 7-17, 1997. 
4] M. Bellare, J. A. Garay, R. Hauser, A. Herzberg, H. Krawczyk, M. Steiner, 
G. Tsudik, E. V. Herreweghen, and M. Waidner. Design, implementation, 
and deployment of the ikp secure electronic payment system. In Selected 
Areas in Communication, IEEE Journal on, volume 18, pages 611-627, 
April 2000. 
5] M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham. A logic of authentication. In 
ACM Transactions on Computer System, volume 8, 1990. 
6] D. Chadwick. Smart cards aren't always the smart choice. In Computer, 
number 142-143, 1999. 
118 
7] C. C Chang, R. J. Hwang, and D. J. Buechrer. Using smart cards to 
authenticate passwords. In Security Technology Proceeding, number 154-
156, 1993. 
8] C. C Chang and C. S. Laih. Remote password authentication with smart 
cards. In Computers and Digital Techniques, volume 139, page 372, July 
1992. 
9] C. C. Chang and T. C Wu. Remote password authentication with smart 
cards. In Computers and Digital Techniques, volume 138, pages 165-168, 
May 1991. 
10] F. Chau. Smart card technology. In U.S. Department of 
Commerce - National Trade Data Bank, November 2000. 
http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/hongkong/isa/isar0040.htmL 
.11] Z. Chen. Java Card Technology for Smart Cards: Architecture and Pro-
grammer's Guide. The Java series. Addison-Wesley, 2000. 
12] D. Coppersmith. The data encryption standard (des) and its strength 
against attacks. In IBM Journal of Research and Development, May 1994. 
13] D. W. Davies and W. L. Price. Security for Computer Networks. John 
Wiley and Sons, 1984. 
14] D. E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982. 
15] M. T. El-Hadidi, N. H. Hegazi, and H. K. Asian. Performance eval-
uation of a new hybrid encryption protocol for authentication and key 
distribution. In IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications 
Proceedings, pages 16-22, 1999. 
119 
16] F. J. T. Fabrega, J. C. Herzog, and J. D. Guttman. Strand spaces: Why is 
a security protocol correct? In 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations 
Workshop, pages 160-171, 1998. 
17] M. K. Franklin and M. K. Reiter. Fair exchange with a semi-trusted third 
party. In AT&T Laboratories, 1997. 
18] Gemplus. Gemmobile card issuer. 
http: / / www.gemplus.com / products / software / gmobile_card�ssiier .htm. 
19] Gemplus. Gemplus wallet. 
http: / / www.gemplus.com / products / software / wallet / index, htm. 
20] Gemplus. Gemutilities. 
http:// www. gemplus. com / pro ducts / software / gemutilities_mktng .htm. 
21] Gemplus. Gemxpresso rad 211. 
http: / / www. gemplus. com / products / software / gemxpresso_rad_211 .htm. 
'22] Gemplus. Smartxcess cashcard explorer, 
http:// www. gemplus. com / pro ducts / software / smartxcess / index, htm. 
23] Gemplus. GemXpresso 211 V2 Card: Reference Manual Version 2.0. 
Gemplus, May 2000. 
24] Gemplus. GemXpresso RAD 211 v2.3/2.3 IS and v2.4 PK/2.4 PK IS: 
Getting Started Version 2.0. Gemplus, July 2000. 
25] Gemplus. GemXpresso RAD 211 v2.3/2.3 IS and v2.4PK/24 PK IS: 
User's Guide Version 1.0. Gemplus, July 2000. 
26] L. Gong. Variations on the themes of message freshness. In lEE computer 
Security Foundations Workshop Proceeding, June 1993. 
120 
27] D. Graft, M. Pabrai，and U. Pabrai. Methodology for network security 
design. In Ninth Annual International Phoenix Conference on Computers 
and Communications, pages 675-682, 1990. 
28] The Object Management Group. Unified Modeling Language Version 1.1. 
1997. 
29] S. Haber and W. S. Stornetta. How to time-stamp a digital document. In 
Journal of Cryptology, pages 99-111, 1991. 
30] G. Hachez and J. J. Quisquater. Biometrics, access control, smart cards: 
a not so simple combination. In Proceedings of the Fourth Working Con-
ference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS 
2000), pages 273-288, September 2000. 
31] U. Hansmann, M. S. Nicklous, T. Schack, and F. Seliger. Smart Card 
Application Development Using Java. Springer, 2000. 
32] Hendry. Smart Card Security and Applications. Artech House Inc., 1997. 
33] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, and D. Solo. Internet x.509 
public key infrastructure certificate and crl profile. January 1999. 
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2459.html. 
34] G. Howland. Development of an open and flexible payment system. 
November 1996. http://www.systemics.com/docs/sox/overview.htmL 
35] M. S. Hwang and L. H. Li. A new remote user authentication scheme using 
smart cards. In IEEE Transaction on Consumer Electronics, volume 46， 
pages 28-30, Feburary 2000. 
36] F. Joshua. When is a singleton not a singleton. In Javaworld - Design 
Pattern, January 2001. 
121 
37] L. Lamport. Password authentication with insecure communications. In 
Communications of the ACM, volume 24, pages 770-772, November 1981. 
38] H. W. Lee and T. Y. Kim. Smart card based offline micropayment frame-
work using mutual authentication scheme. In Global Telecommunication 
Conference, volume 4, pages 2514-2519, 1998. 
39] B. Lewis and D. J. Berg. Multithreading Programming with Java Tech-
nology. Java series. Prentice Hall, 2000. 
40] S. Liu and M. Silverman. A practical guide to biometric security technol-
ogy. In IT Professional, pages 27-32, January 2001. 
41] X. Lorphelin. Internet and smart card application deployment. In J Source, 
August 1999. 
42] Microsoft. Smart card for windows. 
http://www.scia.org/SignificantEvents/98msft_sc.htm. 
43] Y. S. Moon, H. C. Ho, K. L. Wan, and S. T. Wong. Collaborative finger-
print authentication by smart card and a trusted host. In Electrical and 
Computer Engineering, volume 1, pages 108-112, 2000. 
44] R. Morris and K. Thompson. Password security: A case study. In Com-
munications of the ACM^ volume 22, pages 594-597, November 1979. 
45] Multos. The multi-application operating system for smart cards, 
http://www.multos.com/. 
46] Netscape. Secure socket layer ssl. http://www.netscape.com. 
47] OpenCard. Opencard framework, http://www.opencard.org. 
48] L. C. Paulson. Proving security protocols correct. In 14th Symposium on 
Logic in Computer Science, pages 370-381, 1999. 
122 
49] P.A. Pays and F. D. Comarmond. An intermediation and payment system 
technology. In Fifth internation world wide web conference, May 1996. 
http: //www5conf.inriair/fich_html/papers/P27/Overview.htmL 
50] M. Pistoia, D. F. Reller, D. Gupta, M. Nagnur, and A. K. Ramani. Java 
2 network security. In Prentice Hall, 1999. 
51] M. K. Reiter and S. G. Stubblebine. Toward acceptable metrics of au-
thentication. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, number 10-20, 
1997. 
52] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital 
signatures and public key cryptosystems. In Communications of the ACM, 
February 1978. 
53] H. E. Rose. A course in number theory. Oxford University Press, second 
edition, 1996. 
54] RSA. Rsa secureid. 
http://www.rsasecurity.com/products/securid/index.html. 
55] Schlumberger. Cyberflex access sdk 3.0. 
http://www.l.slb.com/smartcards/products/network/sdk.html. 
56] R. W. Schmidt. Java Network Launching Protocol & API specification 
version 1.0. Sun, December 2000. 
57] B. Schneier. Applied Cryptography second edition: Protocols, Algorithm, 
and Source Code in C, John Wiley k Son, second edition, 1996. 
.58] B. Schneier. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in Networked World. Wiley 
Computer Publishing, 2000. 
59] B. Schneier. Self-study course in block cipher cryptanalysis. In Cryptolo-
gia, pages 18-34, January 2000. 
123 
60] B. Schneier and A. Shostack. Breaking up is hard to do: Modeling security 
threats for smart cards. In USENIX Workshop on Smart Card Technology, 
pages 175-185, October 1999. 
61] M. R. Schroeder. Number theory in science and communication. Springer 
Verlag, second edition, February 1985. 
62] H. Schuldt, A. Popvici, and H. J. Schek. Automatic generation of reliable 
e-commerce payment processes. In Web Information Systems Engineering 
2000, volume 1, pages 434-441, 2000. 
63] V. Y. Shen. ecyberpay - a micropayment solution for electronic com-
merce on the web. September 2000. http://www.ecyberpay.com/zh-
tw/body/press/hkcc.htm. 
64] W. Stallings. Cryptography and Network Security. Prentice Hall, second 
edition, 1998. 
65] Sun. Java 2 sdk. http://java.sun.eom/products/jdk/l.2/. 
66] Sun. Java card technology. 
http: //java.sun.com/products/javacard/index.html. 
67] Sun. Java cryptography extension, http://java.sun.com/products/jce/. 
68] Sun. Java secure socket extension, http://java.sun.com/products/jsse/. 
69] Sun. Java security, http://java.sun.com/security. 
70] Sun. Java web start, http://java.sun.com/products/javawebstart/index.html. 
71] K. Topley. Core Swing Advanced Programming. Prentice Hall, 2000. 
72] H. C. Tsang, K. S. Leung, and K. H. Lee. Design and analysis of 
smart card based remote authentication protocol for internet-based sys-
tem. Technical report, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. 
124 
'.：^'- •'•;•；• •‘ .:.,’〔+•.' • ..: •:. , ... ‘ .... . . . . . . . . . . • 
V .:. .•.:...?、::.）.:. ..:.•’.：. •• •  . . . . . . . . 
… . . … 『 / … • , • • • ^ , . , 
.:.、.::•:::...:.:：.：/ •：  .V '“；’ ••、:.:‘： ... ,1 ,.:.•+••.•.. ... .、+• ,„. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
•r：：；-^;；-:^^^^ :；.. . ：；；•,.-; ... . -f) .,... 
..::>.::,:,、-•••"：. • ..: : .、., • • 、 I』 . 
. • • . 、 . V • . 
. 、 . : . ’ . . . . . . . . . • I . . . . 
.•••• ‘ ‘ • , . . . . . . . . 
： ； ： . . • , • • . 
.:::。”.";‘::..,:.::、..:• •…：•• • • -* • . 
. . . . ‘ ‘ ： ‘ . ,. . • , .1 • . 
„ ‘， . \ -. ： •• • . . • . . • ‘ - . . - • ：‘ • 
CUHK L i b r a r i e s 
圓圓•lllllllllllll 
